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"Doubling-Down" for Defendants:
The Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform
Scott DeVito* & Andrew W. Jurs**
Abstract
Tort reform legislation developed as a response to a series of
insurance crises and reactions that blamed the personal injury
compensation system for those problems. Since measures of tort reform
have been adopted, many researchers have analyzed their effects within
and beyond the legal system, assessing how they affect damages,
insurance claims, health costs, and physician supply.
Our study analyzes an underdeveloped area of research: the effect
of tort reform on the filing of cases in court. Using two databases of
state court filing data over 12 years, we examine how a damages cap for
medical negligence claims affects case filings in the years immediately
after its adoption. With several test states, we find that when a state
adopts med mal damages caps, there is a statistically significant drop of
23 percent in med mal filings. We confirm this effect by also measuring
the effect of a cap's nullification, and find that in the aftermath of a cap's
removal case filings increase by 29 percent. Our work can therefore
confirm and quantify the effect of damages caps on case filing.
Yet the finding is much more salient when we consider it in the
context of a new and interesting study published in the Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies. In their 2013 study, Myungho Paik, Bernard
Black, and David Hyman found that filings of med mal torts have
decreased in the last decade, not only in tort reform states but also in
states without it! If so, our finding of a statistically significant drop in
med mal filings in response to tort reform has a "doubling-down" effect:
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there is one reduction in filings due to tort reform, and also a background
reduction in filings based on larger, non-statutory changes.
We believe that our findings regarding the effect of tort reform on
med mal filings and the "doubling-down" effect significantly modify the
cost-benefit analysis of tort reform. The positive impacts of tort reform
have been significantly oversold, and the effects of tort reform
disproportionately impact certain vulnerable citizens. If so, we believe
that claimants are being doubly squeezed without significant public
benefit. We therefore suggest that state legislators reconsider these
efforts, or risk court intervention due to equal protection challenges.
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Tort reform began as a response to insurance crises and health care
providers' dissatisfaction with personal injury litigation and its method
of "jackpot justice."1 Whether the personal injury system was indeed the
root cause of insurance crises remained largely untested prior to the
adoption of tort reform.2  Only after the adoption of tort reform
legislation did researchers examine whether tort reform was necessary in
the first instance.3 In addition, many also examined how tort reform
measures-like limiting claimants' ability to initiate a lawsuit, increasing
the standards for proof of claims, and decreasing available damages-
result in effects both within and beyond the legal system. 4  After
examining the extensive research in the area, we offer our study in the
most underdeveloped area of prior research: the effect of tort reform on
the filing of cases at the state level. 5 By examining the data, we can
demonstrate that the effects of tort reform have been harsher than
previously expected, and when that finding is combined with research
testing the claimed benefits of tort reform, its cost-benefit balance is
demonstrably off.
1. See, e.g., FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND
ETHICS 81 (1994); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 28
(2008); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12 (1991). As for the
"jackpot justice" phraseology, see Republican Platform 2000, N.Y. TIMES,
http://bit.ly/lceOoCl (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (denouncing "the trial lawyers' system
of jackpot justice" and suggesting legislative reform). See generally infra Part II.A.
2. See SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 5 (dismissing the empirical foundation for
arguments connecting tort liability to increased expenditures, noting that much of the
public discourse is based on anecdotes); WEILER, supra note 1, at 12-14 (categorizing the
connection of tort liability to problems with health care as "based largely on myth rather
than fact"); Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical
Analysis of Tort Reform's Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND.
L. REv. 257, 259-60, 291 (2013) (asserting that "there is a dearth of empirical evidence"
exploring whether tort liability actually stifles economic activity in context of products
liability reform, despite tort reform proponents' assertion of the connection). See
generally infra Part II.A.
3. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1985); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 70-
71 (1993); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim
Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 208 (2005) (noting
proponents of tort reform adhere to the theory that "[m]ed mal liability is the disease,
insurance rate spikes are the symptoms"); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the
Tort System in Illinois, 93 ILL. B.J. 340 (2005); see also infra Parts II.B.3, IV.B.
4. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 81; WEILER, supra note 1, at 29-32; Glen 0.
Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 21-26 (1986); see also infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
5. Regarding the difficulty in obtaining data to evaluate the effect of tort reform on
case filings, see Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of Tort Reform 15 (Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-26, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.c fm?abstract-id=2032740.
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To analyze the effects of tort reform, we started by assembling two
databases: a multi-state database of 12 years of state court filing data,
and a state-level database of tort filings.6 We then measured how a
particular type of tort reform measure-medical malpractice damages
caps-affected the filing of medical malpractice cases. When we used
our multi-state database to compare the adoption of a damages cap, in
North Dakota in 1995 and Florida and Mississippi in 2003, to eight states
7that did not have medical malpractice caps, we found that adoption of a
damages cap lowered the probability of filing a medical malpractice tort
case by a statistically significant margin of 23 percent.8 Similarly, when
we compared Florida and Mississippi, each of which adopted a medical
malpractice cap in 2003, to Colorado, Missouri, and North Dakota, each
of which had a damages cap during the relevant period, we found that
adoption of a damages cap lowered the probability of filing a medical
malpractice tort case by a statistically significant margin of 13 percent. 9
Not only can we show a reaction to the initiation of the damages cap, but
we can also confirm an effect by offering a new analysis not previously
contained in the literature, namely, the effect of nullification of a
damages cap. Using the state-level database, we analyzed the effect of a
court's nullification of Alabama's damages cap in 1995, and found that
the removal of a cap resulted in a statistically significant 29 percent
increase in court filings.10
Clearly the adoption or removal of damages caps affects the filing
of medical malpractice tort cases. This finding is not isolated, because if
we also consider a new finding from a recent study in the Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies (JELS), our results have quantified a new and
interesting phenomenon: the "doubling-down" effect of tort reform.l' In
the JELS study, Myungho Paik and his colleagues found that filings of
medical malpractice torts have decreased in states both with and without
tort reform.12 Because all states are experiencing a drop in filings, our
analysis showing a statistically significant reduction in filings in states
with tort reform, as compared to non-reform states, demonstrates that
plaintiffs in reform states are experiencing two separate effects. First,
plaintiffs are less likely to file a med mal tort regardless of tort reform
6. Regarding the methodology of assembling the datasets, see infra Part III.A.
7. The comparison (or "control") states were: Arizona, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming. None of these states had
medical malpractice caps in place during the relevant period. See infra Part III.A.3.a.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Parts III.A.3.b, III.B.
10. See infra Parts III.A.3.c, III.B.
11. Myungho Paik et al., The Receding Tide of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part
1-National Trends, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 612, 612 (2013).
12. Id. at 625 tbl.2; see also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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due to a background reduction of overall filings. Second, plaintiffs in
tort reform states are less likely to file med mal torts due to the effect of
tort reform. Essentially, there are two separate and distinct forces
causing med mal filings to shrink, depicted as follows:
FIGURE 1. Combined effect of
med mal caps and declining baseline
Considering the "doubling-down" effect and the larger state of
empirical research in the area of tort reform, we believe that the cost-
benefit analysis of damages caps and other reform measures changes
significantly.1 3 Proponents' claims of positive benefits to tort reform
have been greatly oversold, while the negative effects of the caps have
increased. Since that is the case, we believe state legislators must
reconsider tort reform, and in so doing, reject the "silver bullet" theory of
a cure-all for problems with tort litigation. Otherwise, legislators can
continue along the tort reform path, knowing the full effects of their
legislation and risking court intervention to overturn their measures on
equal protection grounds.
14
We begin the analysis of these issues in Part II with the historical
story of the development of tort reform, why it began, and what different
measures have been considered. Additionally, Part II examines the
recent empirical research in the area of tort reform, including its effects
13. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
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within the legal system--on damages awards, access to counsel, and case
filings-and its effects beyond the legal system-on the number of
insurance claims, the size of those claims, insurance premiums, medical
expenditures, and physician supply.
We then begin our empirical analysis in Part III. We first explain
the methodology of our study, including the construction of our two
datasets for analysis. Next, we examine how case filings react to the
adoption or nullification of damages caps in med mal cases, finding the
aforementioned 13 percent to 23 percent decrease in filings after
adoption of a cap, and 29 percent increase after its demise. Both of these
findings demonstrate a direct connection between the adoption of
damages caps and plaintiffs' filings in court.
In Part IV, we examine the implications of our findings in the
context of the larger debate over tort reform. First, we discuss how, due
to the background reduction in filings even in states without tort reform,
a statistically significant effect of tort reform "doubles-down" the impact
on plaintiffs. Then, we consider this finding in the larger picture of
research in the area and perform a cost-benefit analysis of tort reform,
finding that its benefits have been greatly oversold, and that its negative
impacts are increasing. As a consequence, we urge state legislators to
reconsider their tort reform measures, or risk court intervention to
overturn them.1
5
By measuring actual court filing data in many states over more than
a decade, this study quantifies the effect of damages caps on plaintiffs'
filings, finding a direct effect of reforms on plaintiff case filings.
Considering this finding in the context of other recent research in tort
reform, we believe the negative consequences of tort reform are
becoming more apparent, and suggest legislators reconsider those
methods moving forward.
II. TORT REFORM-JUSTIFICATION, ADOPTION, AND RESEARCH ON ITS
EFFECTS
Tort reform encompasses a variety of legislative changes affecting
plaintiffs considering personal injury lawsuits, including: the substantive
and procedural burdens of filing, the burden of proof and causation at
trial, and the available recovery. In this Part, we will review why
legislatures adopted tort reform, when the changes to the law took place,
and what current research exists to measure the effects of reform.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Justification and Adoption
Proponents of change in personal injury litigation have offered tort
reform proposals as their response to an out-of-control judicial system
and to spiraling costs. While a complete historical analysis of tort reform
and its origin, development, and effects is beyond the scope of this
Article, a brief history of the justifications for reform is in order. To ease
the discussion, it helps to consider these reforms as three separate
epochs: the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 2000s. 16 In each period, the
issue of tort reform became hotly debated, although not always for the
same reasons.
In the 1960s, malpractice claims rose sharply, possibly as much as
six-fold,17 and the malpractice insurance industry had to respond. Many
simply abandoned the business of medical negligence insurance or
threatened to do so. 18  With fewer remaining carriers and claims
increasing into the decade of the 1970s, insurance rates for physicians
climbed steeply.' 9 Some studies indicate that insurance premiums rose
by 600 percent for lower-risk specialties or insureds, but by 900 percent
or more for higher-risk policies.2° Physicians paying the premiums and
feeling dissatisfied with the increased costs looked for explanations that
justified such steep increases.
A survey conducted in 1971 captured the attitudes of physicians
toward the personal injury compensation system.21  The physician
responses indicated a deep distrust and antipathy toward attorneys and
the compensation system for injuries. Of all physicians, 77 percent
believed that the medical malpractice situation was "worse now than ever
before," and nearly 47 percent of the doctors believed it was for a reason
outside the medical profession.22 Of the 873 doctors surveyed, 26
percent believed aggressive lawyers were the reason for more common
16. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 7-8; see also SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at
28.
17. WEILER, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Mark C. Kendall, Expectations, Imperfect
Markets, and Medical Malpractice Insurance, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 167, 176 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978)).
18. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 8-9; see also BARBARA WERTHMANN, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW: How MEDICINE IS CHANGING THE LAW 127 (1984).
19. WEILER, supra note 1, at 27; WERTHMANN, supra note 18, at 127.
20. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 8 (citing Mark Kendall & John Haldi, The
Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE app. at 494, 541
(1973)). During roughly the same period, Robinson notes that hospital insurance rates
rose 750% between 1965 and 1973. Robinson, supra note 4, at 8 (citing MICHAEL T.
SUMNER, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 19 (1979)).
21. William R. Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey ofPhysicians' Attitudes on Medical
Malpractice, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 20, app. at 83.
22. Id. app. at 85.
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malpractice suits. 23 Finally, when asked how best to alleviate problems
with malpractice, the most common response-from 26 percent of the
respondents-was to adopt "laws limiting such suits," while an
additional 14 percent chose "reduced court judgments" as the solution.24
The survey suggests that, in the face of rising malpractice insurance
premiums, the medical community had found their culprit-they blamed
lawyers. In his analysis of the development of tort reform, Paul Weiler
wrote:
[Doctors'] familiar refrain, echoed by many pundits and politicians,
is that tort costs have soared because patient attorneys seeking hefty
contingent fees are filing too many spurious allegations of medical
negligence, and because unsophisticated juries, moved by the plight
of often seriously disabled plaintiffs, too often give in to the
temptation to use the doctor's insurer to award huge damage sums as
redress for the patient's needs, irrespective of whether there is any
tangible evidence of fault on the part of the doctor.26
Something had to be done to rein in the personal injury lottery, and so
the medical community looked to state legislatures for help.
State legislatures responded to the lobbying efforts of the medical
community, fearing abandonment by health care providers if they did
27not. Broadly speaking, reforms would include changes to the initiation
of claims, the modifications for standards of proof at trial, and the
28limitation of recovery. Plaintiffs would now face serious impediments
blocking the path to recovery, from changes in the statute of limitations
at the start to the limitation of damage recovery after trial.29 The first
cycle of tort reform had run its course.
23. Id. app. at 84.
24. Id. app. at 85.
25. The preface to a 1975 symposium from Duke Law Journal captures the moment:
The term "medical malpractice" has become an increasingly frightening one to
patients, doctors, and insurers as well. In recent months, the spectre of
physician strikes, astronomical damage awards, soaring liability insurance
premiums, and allegations of poor-quality medical care have stirred debate in
state legislatures, in Congress, in the press, and in scholarly journals. The
medical malpractice crisis is real, and the problems which created that crisis
remain with us.
Symposium on Medical Malpractice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1177, 1177 (cited in SLOAN &
CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 309); see also SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 85; WEILER,
supra note 1, at 11-12, 27; Robinson, supra note 4, at 14.
26. WEILER, supra note 1, at 12.
27. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 79; WEILER, supra note 1, at 27; WERTHMANN,
supra note 18, at 127.
28. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 21-26.
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Following the reforms of the 1970s, tort reform remained dormant
until a new crisis began in the mid-1980s. The crisis once again began
with insurance cost concerns, rising out of premium increases spiking in
the period from 1984-1987.30 Physicians again responded by lobbying
for limitations on personal injury liability, and the state legislatures
obliged with a second wave of tort reform measures. In contrast to the
1970s, however, the 1980s also saw a political aspect of the crisis.
Responding to the effect the insurance crisis had on business interests,
the Reagan administration created a Tort Policy Working Group ("Study
Group") led by the Attorney General to study the issue. Consisting of
officials from the Department of Commerce, the Small Business
Administration, and the Department of Justice,31 the Study Group's
report laid blame squarely on an out-of-control personal injury system by
stating: "while there are a number of factors underlying the insurance
availability/affordability crisis, tort law is a major cause which the
federal government can address .. .,,3 The Study Group recommended
a series of tort reform measures that echoed the earlier reforms of the
1970s, namely, curtailing the filing of claims, increasing the standards of
proof for trial, and limiting the collection of damages.33 Tort reform had
again been the response to an insurance crisis.
By the 2000s, the political aspects of tort reform had become a
major driving force behind legislative change. In the 2000 platform of
the Republican Party, the party blamed "the trial lawyers' system of
jackpot justice" as a problem requiring major legislative reform.34 Once
President Bush assumed office, the platform had a powerful proponent.35
Yet it was only after a new crisis in insurance that the platform gained
29. For a more detailed examination of the types of reform measures, and their
adoption cycles, see infra Part II.A, notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussing
different measures, and different eras of state adoption of same).
30. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 28 (citing Property/Casualty Insurance Cycle,
INS. INFO. INST., http://bit.ly/lnHfmCD (last visited Feb. 17, 2014)).
31. TORT POLICY WORKING GRP., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 1 (1986) [hereinafter
TORT POLICY STUDY GROUP], available at http://1.usa.gov/lmoK8EZ.
32. Id. at 5 (emphasis added); see also Product Liability Reform Proposals: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.,
99th Cong. 25-29 (1986) [hereinafter Meese Statement] (statement of The Honorable
Edwin Meese III, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
33. TORT POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 31, at 4; Meese Statement, supra note
32, at 27-28; see also S.Y. TAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE LAW,
MANAGING THE RISK 266 (2006).
34. See Republican Platform 2000, supra note 1.
35. See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the
Medical Malpractice "Crisis ", 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 477, 482 (2012).
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significant momentum on the issue. 36 While republicans in the House
passed tort reform in 2004,3 7 multiple states-mainly, but not
exclusively, Republican-led states-also adopted significant reforms.
38
Once again, a crisis in insurance, this time with a political component,
led to legislative reform limiting tort recovery through litigation.
In examining this historical story, the three eras of tort reform all
grew out of the desire to limit the filing and recovery of lawsuits in order
to lessen insurance premiums. 39  The specific reforms adopted
demonstrate how these goals translated into legislation. Some legislation
directly addressed the ability of a claimant to initiate a lawsuit. One type
of legislation required an initial screening of any claim of medical
malpractice by a qualified expert or expert panel.4n Other states changed
the applicable statute of limitations for filing of a case alleging medical
negligence.4' While these reforms target the procedural aspects of the
claimant's suit, another significant reform targeted the structural aspect
of the litigation: the ability to get a lawyer through limitations on
contingency fee agreements.42 Other reforms addressed the standards
used in court to prove a claim once it has been filed. Some states
required experts to attest to the standard of care in the particular
community in question, or in a similar locale, thus limiting the
availability of some experts.4 3 Others limited or eliminated the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor, a controversial and limited way to avoid proof of
breach, or challenged the rules for informed consent. 44
36. See James Dao, A Push in States to Curb Malpractice Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2005, at A21; see also SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 28 (citing
Property/Casualty Insurance Cycle, supra note 30).
37. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004). The same bill also passed in 2003. Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong.
(2003). Both failed in the Senate. See H.R. 5 (108th), GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr5 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014); H.R. 4280
(108th), GoVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congressbills/108/hr4280 (last visited Feb.
17,2014).
38. Dao, supra note 36.
39. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 81 (noting similarity of goals for different waves
of reform).
40. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 81; WEILER, supra note 1, at 29. See generally
Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) (Univ. of Tex. Sch.
of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 184, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=902711.
41. WEILER, supra note 1, at 28; Robinson, supra note 4, at 21-22.
42. WEILER, supra note 1, at 28-29; Robinson, supra note 4, at 22.
43. WEILER, supra note 1, at 30; Robinson, supra note 4, at 23.
44. WEILER, supra note 1, at 30; Robinson, supra note 4, at 24.
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Finally, even if a claimant successfully filed a claim and then
proved the necessary elements at trial, the state would limit the
availability of damages using a variety of measures. Some statutes
simply cap the damages available in any claim of medical malpractice,
while others cap only the noneconomic component of the damages.45
More limited reforms involved the limitation of joint and several
liability, the offsetting of damages due to payment from a collateral
source, or the elimination of lump-sum payments of damage awards.46
The reformers believed these reforms collectively would provide a
legislative solution to the insurance crisis by limiting or eliminating one
of its primary causes.
When one examines when these reforms have been adopted, the
cyclical nature of the tort reform movement becomes apparent. If we
look at when states adopted damages caps in medical malpractice
cases-the tort reform measure we will examine in Part III-the three
eras of tort reform seem quite clear.47
1975 CA, LA, OH
1976 IN, MD, NE, SD
1977 VA
1978 NM





2003 FL, MS, TX, OK
2004 NV
45. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 81; WEILER, supra note 1, at 32; Robinson, supra
note 4, at 25-26.
46. MCCLELLAN, supra note 1, at 81; WEILER, supra note 1, at 31-32; Robinson,
supra note 4, at 26.
47. For a comprehensive list of the adoption of various tort reform measures, see
generally Avraham, supra note 40. The dates of each of the medical malpractice caps in
Table 1, except for North Carolina, are contained therein. Id. Avraham's database is
only current through 2010. Id. As such, the North Carolina statute in the chart, adopted
in June 2011, is not contained therein. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.19 (West,
Westlaw through S.L. 2013-257 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.). Note also that several states do
not neatly fit the "three era" pattern, as North Dakota and Montana adopted medical
malpractice caps in 1995, and North Carolina did in 2011. Avraham, supra note 40.
2014]
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2005 AK, CT, SC, GA, IL
2006 WI
2011 NC
TABLE 1. Adoption of damages caps in medical
malpractice cases, by year of adoption
In sum, the tort reform movement of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century was a direct response to cyclical insurance crises of
the same era: a result of blaming the personal injury system for those
crises, and then responding with legislation intended to curb the excesses
of the tort system.
B. Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Tort Reform
Beyond demagoguery, it is clear that proponents of tort reform did
not have specific data or research to support their legislative agenda.48
Many researchers have sought to empirically test the effect of tort reform
legislation, however, and these studies can be further broken down into
different groupings based on varying methodologies. 49 For purposes of
this summary, the types of studies will be summarized based on the
primary effect being within or outside the legal system.
1. Effects Within the Legal System
When assessing the effect of tort reform on the legal system,
researchers use three factors to measure the effect: the damage awards
given by juries, access to attorneys, and the filing of cases.
Damage award analysis measures whether tort reform has achieved
its intended goal of reducing payouts in personal injury litigation. Even
with this relatively simple metric, however, results are quite varied. In
their 2004 study of two decades of medical malpractice verdicts reported
in California, David Studdert, Tony Yang, and Michelle Mello
discovered that noneconomic damages caps lowered total damage awards
by 34 percent, and the noneconomic portion of damages by 73 percent.50
Even with that clear result, however, Studdert et al. also found that
noneconomic damages caps had enormous variations in their effects,
48. In fact, the existing research-as we will see infra-remains at best
inconclusive, even now. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 31.
49. Id. at 1.
50. David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice
Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 58 (2004).
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drastically reducing recoveries for more seriously injured claimants.5
The same year, a second study-this time by the RAND Institute for
Civil Justice-analyzed California medical malpractice damage awards
using verdicts reported in a statewide trade publication.52 In their
analysis, the authors found a 30 percent reduction in total damages
awarded after a plaintiffs verdict due to the noneconomic damages
cap.53  They noted, however, that these reductions disproportionately
affect two categories of plaintiffs: those with severe injuries such as
brain damage or paralysis, and female claimants. 54 A third study in 2004
regarding medical malpractice verdicts took a close look at damages
caps' disproportionate impact on certain plaintiffs. 55 Examining jury
verdicts in California, Florida, and Maryland, Lucinda Finley found that
caps reduce verdicts to women and the elderly in a statistically
56significant way. To Finley, the disproportionate impact of damages
caps is a clear form of discrimination, inhibiting equal access to justice.
57
A study performed the next year by Catherine Sharkey measured awards
of compensatory damages after many tort reform measures, including
noneconomic damages caps, were enacted.5 8 Using her sample of actual
case data from 1992 to 2001, Sharkey found that if one controls for the
severity of the injury incurred,60 a noneconomic damages cap has no
statistically significant effect on compensatory damages in personal
injury cases.61 In 2009, David Hyman and his colleagues also analyzed
the issue of disproportional impacts of damages caps on certain claimants
using data from medical malpractice cases in Texas. 62 The researchers
found that a noneconomic damages cap reduces the overall recovery by
51. Id. at 5 589 exhibit 3.
52. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-
ECONOMIC AwARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS
UNDER MICRA, at xix (2004), available at http://bit.ly/N3oLZH.
53. Id. at xx.
54. Id. at xxiii.
55. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and
the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004).
56. Id. at 1313.
57. Id. at 1265, 1314.
58. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005).
59. Id. at 446-48.
60. Sharkey also finds that severity of injury does have an effect on recovery, as one
might expect because the injuries sustained require additional compensation. Id. at 470-
72.
61. Id. at 469, 473, 478. This result is not necessarily at odds with the previous
studies, in that many of them find disproportionate impacts due to severity of injury. For
Sharkey, once that severity of injury is accounted for, the noneconomic damages cap has
no statistically significant effect. Id. at 469.
62. David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical
Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009).
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6327 percent, although the reductions were significantly larger for the
elderly or claimants filing based on a fatal injury.64 These studies
collectively indicate that a noneconomic damages cap can decrease
recoveries for injured plaintiffs, but that the effect may
disproportionately impact certain groups, namely, the more seriously
injured, the elderly, and women.
65
Measured reductions in damages may have an impact on injured
claimants' access to counsel, and several studies indicate the problem
may be severe. In the 2004 RAND study of tort reform in California, the
researchers examined the effect of tort reform-both noneconomic
damages caps and also direct contingency fee limitations-on attorneys'
fee recovery in personal injury litigation that went to trial.66 Measuring
each limitation separately, the RAND study found that the noneconomic
damages cap reduced overall attorneys' fees by 30 percent, while the
contingency fee limitations reduced fees by 46 percent. 67  When
examined together, overall fees in the sample group had been slashed 60
percent due to tort reform in California.68 In a study of tort reform on
attorneys' willingness to take cases, Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin
surveyed over 500 plaintiffs' attorneys whose contingency fee recoveries
accounted for a significant portion of their business. 69 Among plaintiffs'
attorneys, a significant portion believes that Texas's tort reform measures
in the area of medical malpractice have had a negative effect on their
practice. 70  They also discovered that tort reform formed one part of
changes to the broader market environment, including negative
advertising and jury perceptions of plaintiffs.7' They conclude that "in
Texas, tort reform succeeded by changing the market environment in
which plaintiffs' lawyers operate, making it harder, in the lawyers'
estimation, to stay profitable. 72 This has an enormous impact on the
operation of the law because "[w]ithout lawyers willing to take an
injured party's case, the law has no teeth. It provides remedies in theory
63. Id. at 380.
64. Id. at381-82.
65. For further discussion of the issue of disproportionate impacts of tort reform, see
infra Part IV.B.
66. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at xxiii-xxv, 35-41; see also supra text
accompanying note 52.
67. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at xxiv fig.S.1, 36-37.
68. Id. at xxiv fig.S.1, 37. Pace and his colleagues are careful to note that this result
includes only trial awards, so it may overestimate the effect since it does not attempt to
measure non-trial cases (settlements, informal claims, etc.). See id. at 37 n.2.
69. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53
EMORY L.J. 1225, 1237 n.30 (2004).
70. Id. at 1239 tbl.2.
71. Id. at 1241 tbl.3, 1244 tbl.4.
72. Id. at 1262.
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only."73 A third study, by Steven Garber and others, has found similar
results in the area of medical malpractice.74 By analyzing the survey
responses of nearly a thousand plaintiffs' attorneys, Garber found that
the likelihood that an attorney takes a case decreases in the event the case
is subject to tort reform.75 In fact, when Garber examined the likelihood
of an attorney taking a case subject to tort reform in light of the expected
dollar amount of the case, the likelihood of an attorney accepting a high-
payoff case decreased more than for low-payoff cases in the event of tort
reform, since those high-payoff cases are more likely to have significant
damage reductions by caps.7 6 Because of these effects, Garber concludes
that tort reform measures limit "access to justice.
' 77
The third major area of empirical assessment of tort reform
measures the effect of reforms on filing rates, attempting to quantify
whether the legislation meets the intended goal of reducing the incidence
of personal injury litigation. 78 A caveat is in order, however; Professor
Theodore Eisenberg and others have found that in the area of filing rates,
the difficulty in obtaining case-specific datasets has limited the number
of studies.79 Of those studies that do measure the effects of tort reform,
results are varied. In 1999, Mark Browne and Robert Puelz performed a
multi-state study analyzing the effect of noneconomic damages caps on
automobile-related personal injury lawsuits.80 By analyzing a dataset of
insurance claims, which included whether a case had been filed in court,
Browne and Puelz found that noneconomic damages caps reduced the
probability of filing of a claim by 65 percent. 81 In her single-state study
in 2008, Patricia Hatamyar measured how comprehensive tort reform in
73. Id.
74. Steven Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits
Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 637 (2009).
75. Id. at 677.
76. Id. at 677.
77. Id. at 682.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29, 32-33.
79. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 15; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF
TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 9 (2004), available at
http://l.usa.gov/lci39SK. On the other hand, there are significantly more studies
measuring the effect of tort reform on claim frequency. See infra Part II.B.2. For our
analysis, we did collect and evaluate a dataset, and we explain that process infra Part
III.A.
80. Mark J. Browne & Robert Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of
Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, 18 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 189 (1999).
81. Id. at 208 (finding the probability of filing drops from 4.0% to 1.4% when a
noneconomic damages cap has been adopted).
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Oklahoma in the early 2000s affected case filings. By looking at the
rate of filing at the time of the reforms to four years later, Hatamyar
found that the cap decreased case filings in the years afterward by 17.5
percent for all torts and by 29.3 percent for medical malpractice claims.83
Finally, just this year Myungho Paik, Bernard Black, and David Hyman
looked at multiple states to assess tort filing rates in the past decade.84
Examining medical malpractice case filing rates in 18 states, the authors
found that within all 18 there had been a collective 33.7 percent drop in
filings.8 5 While the paper lacks specific information comparing cap to
non-cap states, a brief analysis of the numbers indicate a mean per-state
reduction of 23.8 percent for the no-cap states, and 42.4 percent for the
cap states.86
Researchers analyzing tort reform and the legal system have found
significant changes arising from the implementation of various
legislative enactments. Damages caps appear to succeed in reducing the
damages of claimants, but most likely do so disproportionately to certain
groups such as women, the elderly, and the seriously injured. Those
damage reductions appear to affect the economics of the contingency fee
system for plaintiffs' counsel, affecting access to justice for potential
plaintiffs. Finally, although studies on filing rate are the least developed
area of research, they may show case filing reductions attributable to tort
reform measures, although some drop may not be attributable to
legislative changes at all.87
2. Other Effects
Of course, tort reform has significant effects that never reach the
legal system. A second series of studies has addressed the effect of tort
82. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of "Tort Reform" on Tort Case Filings, 43
VAL. U. L. REv. 559 (2009).
83. Id. at 561-62.
84. Paik et al., supra note 11, at 613.
85. Id. at 625 tbl.2.
86. The idea of a background drop in case filings is also supported by a recent study
by the Court Statistics Project at the National Center for State Courts. Reviewing the
caseload statistics of the 13 states with available data, Cynthia Lee and Robert
LaFountain found that between 1999 and 2008, medical malpractice filings dropped 15%.
CYNTHIA G. LEE & ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1, 3 (2011), available at
http://bit.ly/lnHxrk3. A 2012 update covers the period from 2001 to 2010, and finds the
trend continues; between 2001 and 2010, state court filings for medical malpractice cases
declined 23%. Medical Malpractice Caseloads Continue Prolonged Decline, COURT
STAT. PROJECT, http://bit.ly/lgWyQAU (last visited Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Court
Statistics Project].
87. Regarding the background reduction in tort filings, see Paik et al., supra note 11,
at 625 tbl.2. See also supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
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reform in these areas by measuring: the number and payment of claims
by insurance, insurance premiums, medical costs, and the supply of
physicians. In so doing, researchers have examined the broader
implications of the tort reform movement, and whether tort reform has
affected insurance markets as intended.88
Without examining any effects on filing rates in court, several
studies have assessed whether tort reform reduces the number of
insurance claims for compensation. In his 2001 study, Albert Yoon
measured the effect of tort reforms in Alabama on payment of insurance
claims. 9 Yoon collected and analyzed a dataset including 13 years of
medical negligence claims filed against health care providers in four
states.90 By comparing the tort reform state, Alabama, to three control
states, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi, the data demonstrate that
the implementation of a damages cap reduced overall payouts in
Alabama by roughly $20,000, and that this was a greater difference than
the control states by a statistically significant margin.91 Yoon's analysis
also shows that, following the nullification of Alabama's damages cap in
1995,92 average claim payouts increased significantly by about $45,000
per claim, which was above the control state increase by a significant
amount.93 Paik, Black, and Hyman's analysis of tort reform in 2013
mirrors this result. In their analysis of a database of claims paid by
physicians,94 they found that the average payout per claim for large
claims was 23 percent lower in cap states than in non-capped states, and
that when some states adopted caps in the early 2000s, they dropped
from the no-cap level to converge with older cap states' payout rates.95
Their data on the average payout per physician demonstrated a 41
percent difference between cap states and no-cap states.96 As with the
analysis of payout per claim, when states adopted caps in the early
2000s, the payout per physician fell from the no-cap levels to converge
with the older cap state payout rates.97
88. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 30, 36.
89. Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 199 (2001).
90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 216.
92. In 1995, the Alabama Supreme Court overturned the cap on damages for medical
malpractice cases, finding it unconstitutional under state constitutional law. Ray v.
Anesthesia Assocs. of Mobile, P.C., 674 So. 2d 525, 526 (Ala. 1995).
93. Yoon, supra note 89, at 216-20. For our analysis of the effect of Alabama's
nullification of damage caps on filing rates, see infra Part III.B.
94. Regarding the methodology of the study, see Paik et al., supra note 11, at 615-
16.
95. Id. at 627 fig.7.
96. Id. at 628.
97. Id. at 627 fig.7 (Panel B).
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Beyond the payment amounts, Paik, Black, and Hyman also
analyzed the number of paid claims for capped and no-cap states. Using
the same dataset of insurance claims, they found that for the number of
claims filed, states with caps had an average of 25 percent fewer paid
claims. 98  As with the damages amounts, when some states adopted
damages caps in the 2000s, they fell from the higher no-cap rate of paid
claims to converge with the lower old-cap rate.99 The 25 percent
decrease in the rate of paid claims for capped states is slightly larger than
a 10 to 13 percent decrease in total claims found by Ronen Avraham in
his 2007 study addressing the same issue. 100 Avraham studied the issue
with a database of settled claims from the National Practitioners Data
Bank, assessing these settlement claims in light of several types of tort
reform.'0 1 Not only did Avraham find a 10 to 13 percent decrease in the
total number of settled claims due in states with damages caps; he also
found a reduction in the payment-per-doctor amount of 15 to 20
percent. 102 In a state-specific inquiry into the effect of tort reform on
claims made, Leonard Nelson, Michael Morrissey, and Meredith Kilgore
examined claims data in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama contained
within the National Practitioners Data Bank. 10 3 After a cap on damages
in medical malpractice cases came into effect in 2003, Nelson et al.
found a decline in the total payout on claims and the total claims made as
compared to the other control states. 104 Their analysis showed a 38.5
percent decrease in claims, with a corresponding 31.7 percent drop in
total payout. 10 5 The reductions in payout and number of claims indicate
effects on the system of personal injury compensation, but a series of
papers show some debate over whether these reductions translate to a
corresponding reduction in insurance premiums for health care
providers. 0 6 Of course, that was the intention of tort reform in the first
instance.
07
98. Id. at 625.
99. Paik et al., supra note 11, at 626 fig.6.
100. Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reform on Medical
Malpractice Settlement Payments, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. S183, S203 (2007).
101. Regarding the methodology of the study, see id. at S190. For the complete list of
the tort reforms Avraham analyzed, see id. at S 191.
102. Id. at S206. This compares to the 23% difference in payouts in large claims, and
41% difference in payout per physician, found by Paik et al. in their study of the issue.
See Paik et al., supra note 11, at 627-28 fig.7; supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
103. Leonard J. Nelson III et al., Medical Malpractice Reform in Three Southern
States, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 69, 141 (2008).
104. Id. at 142.
105. Id. at 146 tbl.8.
106. For an overview of the research in the area, see Leonard J. Nelson III et al.,
Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases, 85 MILBANK Q. 259, 267-69 (2007).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 19, 24.
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A series of older studies from the 1990s analyzed the effect of
damages caps on insurance premiums, finding that caps reduce premiums
by between 8.4 percent and 12.4 percent.' 0 8 One study dissented. In a
1998 study using data from a longer period of time, Mark Paul Guis
found that damages caps might not affect premiums after all.' 09 The
pattern of a majority of studies finding an effect, with some dissent,
continues with the more modem studies. In a 2004 study, Danzon et al.
found a 5.7 percent reduction in premiums for states with caps, and
Kilgore et al. have found a significantly larger effect, between 17.3
percent and 25.5 percent, depending on specialty. 10 A 2009 study by
Patricia Born, W. Kip Vicusi, and Tom Baker also finds noneconomic
damages caps reducing losses to insurance carriers,111 and a 2010 study
of insurance costs by Charles Ellington and his colleagues also found a
reduction of 23.4 percent in hospital malpractice premiums (per bed) in
states with noneconomic damages caps.1 12 However, the studies are not
uniform. In their 1999 analysis, J. Robert Hunter and Joanne Doroshow
rejected the idea that tort reform brings down insurance rates.11 3 When
they examined 14 years of insurance data, they found "no evidence that
general, across-the-board 'tort reform' ... has lowered insurance
rates/loss costs. ' 114  Specifically for medical malpractice-related tort
108. Nelson et al., supra note 106, at 268-69 (citing Daniel Kessler & Mark
McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q. J. ECON. 353 (1996); W.
Kip Vicusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability
Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1995)). In addition, Nelson et al. cite a series of older
studies that measure damages caps and other tort reform in aggregate, finding a 16.6% to
27.7% reduction in insurance premiums after adoption of reforms. Id. (citing W. Kip
Vicusi et al., The Effects of 1980s Tort Reform Legislation on General Liability and
Medical Malpractice Insurance, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 165 (1993); Glenn Blackmon
& Richard Zeckhauser, The Effect of State Tort Reform Legislation on Liability Insurance
Losses and Premiums (1990) (unpublished manuscript)).
109. Mark Paul Guis, Using Panel Data to Estimate the Determinants of Medical
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 5 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 37, 37 (1998) (cited in
Nelson et al., supra note 106, at 269).
110. Nelson et al., supra note 106, at 268 (citing Patricia M. Danzon et al., The
"Crisis" in Medical Malpractice Insurance, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES 55 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004); Meredith L.
Kilgore et al., Tort Law and Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 43 INQUIRY 255
(2006)).
111. Patricia Born et al., The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurers'
Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 209 (2009).
112. Charles R. Ellington et al., State Tort Reforms and Hospital Malpractice Costs,
38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 131 tbl.1 (2010) (displaying mean malpractice premiums of
$4,158 per bed in states with no caps, compared with mean of $3,186 for states with
caps).
113. J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY,
PREMIUM DECEIT: THE FAILURE OF "TORT REFORM" TO CUT INSURANCE PRICES 9 (1999),
available at http://bit.ly/l gWMuEe.
114. Id. at 17.
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reform, the authors found a counterintuitive result: that states with mid-
range tort reforms had insurance premiums increase at a higher rate than
states with no tort reform at all. 1 5 Instead of tort reform changing
insurance rates, they surmised that factors other than tort law must have
driven any change. 1
6
Insurance premium reductions had been one promised benefit of tort
reform, but the research on whether that benefit has been achieved
remains unclear. Proponents of tort reform also promised that it could
result in lowered medical costs. Just as with the insurance premium
issue, however, studies have yet to confirm tort reform does achieve that
desired goal.
In the political climate of the 2000s, health care expenditure had
become a hotly debated issue. By looking at 25 years of Medicare
spending, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzed the effect of
tort reform on health care spending in 2006."17 Once it controlled for
changes to Medicare payment policies, the CBO concluded that
noneconomic damages caps did not demonstrate a statistically significant
effect on Medicare expenditures.'" 8 The report goes so far as to suggest
that there may be an "outside factor that may have caused changes in
relative spending in states that passed tort limits, and that was correlated
with the passage of tort limits.'' 9 More recent studies make similar
conclusions. In a 2009 paper in the Journal of Health Economics, Frank
Sloan and John Shadle also analyzed 25 years of Medicare data and
agreed with the CBO report: "Direct reforms [including damages caps]
did not significantly reduce payments for Medicare-covered services in
any specification.' 120 In conclusion, they believe that "tort reforms do
not significantly affect medical decisions, nor do they have a systematic
effect on patient outcomes."' 21 A more recent study by Myungho Paik
and others addressed the same issue, examining Medicare spending in
light of Texas's comprehensive tort reform of 2003.122 When they
compared high-risk to low-risk areas of Texas, they hypothesized that if
tort reform does work, it would reduce Medicare spending in high-risk
115. Id. at 17
116. Id. at 18.
117. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. No. 2668, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT LIMITS
AND HEALTH CARE SPENDING (2006), available at http://1.usa.gov/lmp0cq5.
118. Id.at35.
119. Id. at34.
120. Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical Evidence for "Defensive
Medicine"? A Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH EcON. 481, 488 (2009).
121. Id.at481,490.
122. Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost Curve? Evidence from
Texas, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 173 (2012).
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counties due to physicians practicing less "defensive medicine. 123 Yet
the data demonstrated that this hypothesis is incorrect. They found "no
evidence that spending levels or trends in high-risk counties declined
relative to low-risk counties and some evidence of increased physician
spending in high-risk counties. 1 24 When Texas was compared to other
states, Paik et al. could also find no evidence of a pattern of reduced
spending after tort reform. 125 They concluded that tort reform is not the
answer to reduce health care expenditure, and those who are "interested
in a magic bullet that would limit the growth of health care spending
should look elsewhere."'
126
Because the data do demonstrate that health care expenditures do
not change in response to tort reform, maybe the benefit can be captured
elsewhere. Some researchers have looked beyond insurance and costs
effects to examine another proposed benefit of tort reform: physician
supply. 127 Yet when the studies are examined as a group, the success of
tort reform at attracting additional health care professionals seems, at
best, mixed. 128 One group of studies measuring the effect of tort reform
on physician supply finds that damages caps do increase the availability
of physicians between four and 12 percent. 129 Yet even in these studies,
the effects of tort reform are much smaller than other, non-liability
factors such as climate, the availability of residency programs, or even
high HMO penetration. 3° In contrast to these studies, a second group of
studies does not find that damages caps affect physician supply. In
examining the effect of damages caps in periods of time between ten and
30 years, three separate studies were unable to find evidence that
123. Id. at 181-82.
124. Id. at 173 (emphasis added), 203.
125. Id. at 203.
126. Id. at211.
127. Tort reform has always had a connection to the goal of ensuring a continued
supply of health care providers. See supra text accompanying note 27.
128. For a complete list of studies, see Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 22-23 tbl.2.
129. FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE IMPACT OF STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AwARDs ON THE
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS (2003), available at http://1.usa.gov/lelpRLu
(finding "States with caps have about 12 percent more physicians per capita than States
without a cap"); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Medical Malpractice Reform and
Physicians in High-Risk Specialties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S121, S131 (2007) (finding
between a 3.9% and 4.1% greater number of physicians in ten high-risk specialties, and
6.1% to 6.6% increase for the top five specialties, in states with damages caps). See
generally Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 22 tbl.2.
130. HELLINGER & ENCINOSA, supra note 129, at 22 tbl.6 (finding 13.65 more
physicians per 100,000 residents for caps compared to 18.87 for HMO, 169 for residency,
and 60.5 for climate).
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physicians were more likely to reside in states with tort reform.131 In the
aggregate, the studies are mixed and do not clearly support the
proponents' claim that tort reform would radically alter physician
incentives.
3. Post-Hoc Analysis of the Necessity for Reform
Having reviewed recent studies of the effect of tort reform both on
the legal system (examining damage awards, access to counsel, and filing
rates) and on other markets (examining insurance markets, claims,
premiums, medical costs and physician supply), we can now see that the
studies at best provide mixed support for the claims of tort reform
proponents. After looking at the same data, several groups of researchers
began to fundamentally question whether tort reform was necessary in
the first instance. Two studies in 2005 analyzed the issue. At the request
of the Illinois Bar Association and in the context of a state debate over
adoption of tort reform,1 32 Neil Vidmar studied the issue of whether the
perceived "crisis" in tort litigation was real. 133  Vidmar's result is
unequivocal: no data support the idea that insurance premiums were
rising dramatically, and no data indicate an increase in filing of medical
malpractice lawsuits. 134 By Vidmar's calculations, the physician supply
had even increased, both in absolute numbers and in the ratio of
physicians to the overall population. 135 Vidmar concluded: "The best
data for Illinois that were available for this report indicate that juries are
not to blame for the problems involving the increases in doctor's liability
premiums. It is time to look for other causes of the ailment., 136 Despite
the study, the Illinois legislature passed tort reform the same year.137
A second 2005 study analyzing the arguments for tort reform
examined the State of Texas in the years leading to the 2003 tort reforms
131. David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence
from Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S 143, S145 (2007) (finding some
effect in solely rural areas, but only for specialists); Charles Silver et al., The Impact of
the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap on Physician Supply and Insurer
Payouts: Separating Facts from Rhetoric, TEX. ADVOC., Fall 2008, at 25, 27, 29; Y. Tony
Yang et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Liability Pressure on the Supply of
Obstetrician-Gynecologists, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 21 (2008). See generally
Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 22 tbl.2.
132. Illinois did pass tort reform in the period after the study. See Lebron v. Gottlieb
Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ill. 2010) (noting damages cap passed in 2005 before
overturning it).




137. Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 899.
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of that state. 138 In their study, Bernard Black and his research group
analyzed, as Vidmar had done, whether the claims of tort reform
proponents regarding a "crisis" in litigation were true.' 39 When they
analyzed 15 years of insurance claim reports, those claims did not reflect
the reality of litigation in Texas in the years preceding the 2003 reforms.
Black et al. found that the number of claims, the number of large claims,
the percentage of claims that were large, and total payout by insurance
all remained stable in the decade or more prior to 2003.140 In fact, paid
claims per physician and the number of small claims had declined in the
years preceding tort reform. 14' They concluded, as Vidmar did, that
"[t]his evidence suggests that no crisis involving malpractice claim
outcomes occurred."' 142  So while insurance rates had increased, the
source of the issue was not liability costs.
143
Parts of two other studies bear mentioning on the same issue. As
part of their 2008 analysis of physician supply in the wake of Texas's
tort reform of 2003, Charles Silver and his colleagues examined the
physician supply issue in the years preceding passage of tort reform. 44
When they examined Texas's supply of direct care physicians as well as
physicians per capita, the researchers found that Texas did not have a
crisis in physician supply prior to 2003. 145 Instead, the supply of direct
care physicians increased each year of their study, as did the physicians
per capita. 146 Instead, they extrapolate that the number of physicians in
Texas actually is lower after tort reform than it would have been without
it.147
Finally, as part of their 2004 survey of plaintiffs' attorneys in Texas,
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin made an interesting observation
about non-legal changes to the tort landscape. 48 While they examined
the issue of post-tort reform access to attorneys for potential plaintiffs,
they also analyzed the attorneys' perceptions of marketing and
advertising on their work. 149  When asked about the effect of public
relations campaigns on their work, a supermajority of plaintiffs'
138. Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform Act of 2003, H.B. 4, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2003). See generally Avraham, supra note 40.
139. Black et al., supra note 3, at 208 (noting proponents of tort reform adhere to the
theory that "[m]ed mal liability is the disease, insurance rate spikes are the symptoms").
140. Id. at 209-10.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 210.
143. Id. at 255.
144. Silver et al., supra note 131, at 25.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 26 fig. 1, 27 fig.3.
147. Id. at 27 (highlighting that the authors reject any causative claim here, however).
148. Daniels & Martin, supra note 69, at 1225.
149. Id. at 1241.
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attorneys (91 percent) stated these campaigns had a negative impact on
their practices. 150 The authors reported that "Texas plaintiffs' lawyers
fervently believe these campaigns have 'poisoned' the jury pool[.]'
151
Daniels and Martin believe the effect of public relations campaigns is to
harden insurance companies' bargaining positions, making plaintiffs'
work more risky and more expensive. 152 As a result, they believe that
traditional legislative tort reform may be unnecessary to change the tort
environment in Texas, as aggressive public relations soured market
conditions for plaintiffs' attorneys even before statutory change.1
53
Collectively, the works of Vidmar, Black et al., and Daniels and
Martin all suggest that, in retrospect, statutory tort reform may not have
been necessary in the first instance.
III. OUR ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM ON THE FILING OF CASES IN STATE COURT
In his comprehensive analysis of the empirical effects of tort
reform, Eisenberg noted the difficulty in obtaining data necessary to
analyze tort reform. 154 We believe that this data difficulty has made
filing rate analysis the most underdeveloped area of analysis for tort
reform research. We therefore intended to focus our study on that
underdeveloped area of the literature-analysis of the effect of tort
reform on filing rates-by researching the effect of tort reform on case
filings in court.
Because tort reform contains so many separate aspects, discussed
supra Section II.A, 55 we decided to limit our analysis to one aspect of
tort reform: damages caps in medical malpractice cases. Two primary
reasons for this choice exist: First, medical malpractice caps are one of
the most common forms of tort reform, and have been in effect at one
time or another in at least 30 states. 56 That would allow us to have
ample test and control states for our analysis. Second, we found that by
doing a preliminary assessment of the sets of data we did have access to,
we could overcome the difficulties Eisenberg mentioned in data
collection.1
57
150. Id. at 1241 tbl.3.
151. Id. at 1242.
152. Id. at 1243.
153. Daniels & Martin, supra note 69, at 1262.
154. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 15.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
156. See ADVOCACY RES. CTR., AM. MED. Ass'N, CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011),
available at http://bit.ly/MtUvai. See generally Avraham, supra note 40.
157. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 15.
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When we assembled the dataset and ran our analysis, we made a
clear finding: changes to the available damages in medical malpractice
have a clear effect on the filing rate of those cases. We can see clearly
that when a state adopts a damages cap, the number of filings will go
down by 13 percent to 23 percent. 59  We then confirm the effect by
discovering that when a state's damages cap is nullified, the filings rate




Our analysis builds upon the logistic-fixed effect approach we first
applied in our papers establishing that the Daubert161 standard for
scientific evidence is stricter than the Frye'62 standard. 63 To perform the
analysis described in this Article, we began by identifying a metric,
grounded in the filing rate data, to measure the effect of medical
malpractice caps: the relative proportion of medical malpractice torts
filed to all torts filed in a given year. 64 We then created a database of
over 2.5 million actual filings 65 spread over 15 states 166 and a 14-year
158. For the methodology of reaching this conclusion, see infra Parts III.A. 1-4.
159. See infra Part III.B.
160. See infra Part III.B.
161. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
162. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
163. See Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, Et Tu, Plaintiffs? An Empirical Analysis of
Daubert's Effect on Plaintiffs, and Why Gatekeeping Standards Matter (a Lot), 66 ARK.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing analysis of nearly 3.5 million cases showing that
plaintiffs' attorneys believe Daubert to be a stricter standard); Andrew Jurs & Scott
DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert's Effect on Civil
Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (2013) [hereinafter Jurs & DeVito, The
Stricter Standard] (discussing analysis of over 4 million cases showing that defense
attorneys believe Daubert to be a stricter standard).
164. We chose this metric for four reasons. First, it provides ample quantifiable data
that limit researcher subjectivity. Second, because filings represent the onset of actual
legal proceedings, it provides us with a representative sample of the number of actual
disputes that is not distorted by settlements with sealed records. Third, it avoids selection
bias that can arise when the researcher uses analysis of published cases or accepted
appeals. Finally, it is superior to surveys in that it avoids the problem of inaccurate
recall. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 483 (2005) (discussing
the benefits of the removal rate metric).
165. There were a total of 255,791 tort case filings for the relevant periods combined
in Alabama, Minnesota, and Washington. See Scott DeVito, Stata Log File for State
Analysis (July 31, 2013) (on file with author). There were an additional 2,313,348 tort
case filings from the ICPSR data. See Scott DeVito, Stata Log File for ICPSR Analysis
(July 31, 2013) (on file with author). See infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of the
databases from which these data were pulled, and see infra Parts III.A.2-3, for a
discussion of how these data were drawn from those databases.
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span 167 that resulted in a real-world, case-by-case expression of the
relative proportion of medical malpractice torts to all torts. We used that
dataset to perform a series of logistic fixed effects analyses to identify
any correlation between either (1) adoption of a medical malpractice cap
and the filing of medical malpractice cases or (2) elimination of a
medical malpractice cap and the filing of medical malpractice cases. 1
68
Using this metric, dataset, and a fixed effects statistical analysis, we
determined that adoption of a medical malpractice cap decreases the
likelihood that a medical malpractice tort case will be filed, while
elimination of a medical malpractice cap increases the likelihood that a
medical malpractice tort case will be filed. 169  These relationships
establish for the first time, in a statistically significant manner, 7 ° that
medical malpractice caps are barriers to tort victims filing in state court.
1. The Source Data
We performed our analysis using a database containing entries
corresponding to over 2.5 million actual tort filings. 171 Each entry had
three fields: year, state, and a binary field indicating whether a particular
entry corresponded to a medical malpractice tort or to some other kind of
166. We relied upon filings from Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. See Scott DeVito, Stata Log File for State Dataset
Creation (July 31, 2013) (on file with author); Scott DeVito, Stata Log File for ICPSR
Dataset Creation (July 31, 2013) (on file with author); see also infra Part III.A.3
(discussing the creation of the three Study datasets used in the fixed effects analysis).
167. Our data analyzed tort filings during the years 1992-1998 and 2000-2006. See
Stata Log File for State Dataset Creation, supra note 166; Stata Log File for ICPSR
Dataset Creation, supra note 166; see also infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the creation of
the three Study datasets used in the fixed effects analysis).
168. See infra Parts III.A.4.b, III.B.
169. See infra Part III.B.
170. All measures of statistical significance discussed in this Article relate to the p-
value of a statistical hypothesis. We will consider a result to be statistically significant if
its corresponding p-value is less than or equal to 0.05. This means that there is no more
than a one in twenty chance (or 5% chance) that our result is due to chance. DAVID A.
HENSHER, JOHN M. ROSE & WILLIAM H. GREENE, APPLIED CHOICE ANALYSIS: A PRIMER
46-47 (2005). Using a p-value of 0.05 or less as a basis for statistical significance is
consistent with general practice. See, e.g., id.; SCOTT E. MAXWELL & HAROLD D.
DELANY, DESIGNING EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYZING DATA: A MODEL COMPARISON
PERSPECTIVE 47 (2d ed. 2004).
171. There were a total of 255,791 tort case filings for the relevant periods combined
in Alabama, Minnesota, and Washington. See Stata Log File for State Analysis, supra
note 165. There were an additional 2,313,348 tort case filings from the ICPSR data. See
Stata Log File for ICPSR Analysis, supra note 165.
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tort.'7 2 This database was created from four other databases. The largest
was the publicly available court statistic database created by the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the Federal Judicial Center,
available at the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR).173 While the ICPSR database is comprehensive, there
are gaps in its coverage. To fill some of these gaps, we requested data
directly from the appropriate agencies in Alabama, Minnesota, and
Washington for the period from 1991 to 2010 (the "State databases").
174
2. Creating the Datasets
The ICPSR database contained summary information for all 50
states from 1985 to 2009175 including, for each state, the total population
of the state, the number of torts filed in the state, and the number of
medical malpractice torts filed in state. 176  Because we use a logistic
analysis, we could not keep the data in this format. 177 Instead, we needed
172. For example, a non-medical malpractice tort in 1996 North Dakota would have a
data entry of <"North Dakota," 1996, 0> while a medical malpractice tort in the same
year and state would have a data entry of <"North Dakota," 1996, 1>.
173. Our data were created using data drawn from a state database of court filings.
The "State Database" was from the National Center for State Courts and contained the
number of case filings in state courts as well as both adult and total population by state
and year. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT STATISTIC SERIES: STUDY No.
3990, STATE COURT STATISTICS, 2002: [UNITED STATES] (2004), available at
http://bit.ly/O1L3vU; NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT STATISTIC SERIES:
STUDY No. 9266, STATE COURT STATISTICS, 1985-2001: [UNITED STATES] ii (2005)
[hereinafter STUDY No. 9266], available at http://bit.ly/le2k2gQ (noting that the "data
collection provides comparable measures of state appellate and trial court caseloads by
type of case for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico"); NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, 09266-0024-CODEBOOK 1-46 (1997) (on file with authors) (listing
variables and codes for trial court data from 1988-1992).
174. Our data were created using data from Alabama and Washington drawn from
excel spreadsheets created and provided by each state's Administrative Office of the
Courts. E-mail from Scott DeVito, Assoc. Professor of Law, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, to
Dean Hartzog, Assistant Legal Dir. & Pub. Info. Officer, Admin. Office of Courts (Jan.
21, 2011, 10:51 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Andrew W. Jurs, Assistant
Professor of Law, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, to Wash. State Ctr. for Court Research (Jan.
6, 2011, 10:01 EST) (on file with authors). The data from Minnesota were provided in
the same format but were provided by the State Court Administrator's Office. E-mail
from Andrew W. Jurs, Assistant Professor of Law, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, to Debra
Dailey (Jan. 5,2011, 15:45 EST) (on file with authors).
175. STUDY No. 9266, supra note 173, at ii (describing the "data collection [as]
provid[ing] comparable measures of state appellate and trial court caseloads by type of
case for the 50 states").
176. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT STATISTICS, 1985-1995:
[UNITED STATES] 6, 9-12 (1995) (on file with authors) (describing data in database).
177. In a statistical analysis there are two types of variables: independent and
dependent. The dependent variables are the variables whose values explain the value of
the independent variable. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI & DAWN C. PORTER, ESSENTIALS
OF ECONOMETRICS 8 (4th ed. 2010). Often the dependent variable is a continuous real
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to take the summary data and create one entry for each tort filed. If the
ICPSR data told us that in Year X, State A had 4,000 torts filed of which
300 were medical malpractice torts, then we created a dataset that
contained 4,000 entries keyed to Year X and State A of which 3,700
were identified as "torts" and 300 were identified as "medical
malpractice torts."
Before we could create that dataset we needed to take into account
population change because it could easily distort our results. Where
population has increased during the relevant period, there may be a
comparable increase in the raw number of torts and medical malpractice
torts filed simply as a function of the increase in the number of people
and not as a function of the rate of torts per person increasing. Similarly,
where population has decreased over time, we may have a decrease in
the raw number of torts and medical malpractice torts filed simply as a
function of the decrease in number of people, not a decrease in the rate of
filing.
For example, assume State A had 10,748 torts filed in 1985 of
which 319 were identified as medical malpractice torts, but in 1993 State
A had 12,940 torts filed of which 614 were medical malpractice torts. If
we simply look at these numbers, then it appears that tort filings have
increased by about 20 percent and medical malpractice filings have
nearly doubled. But, if State A's population significantly increased
during this period of time, that view is misleading. Assume that in 1985
there were 3,187,000 people in State A, while in 1993 there were
3,936,000 people living in State A. During that eight-year period, State
A saw a 23.5 percent growth in population. We would expect that the
raw numbers of torts filed and medical malpractice torts filed would
increase by a similar amount during this period as a direct result of the
population growth. Only when the change in filings differs significantly
from the population growth or decrease do we have good reason to think
something other than population growth is in play.
One way to avoid the problem arising from population growth is to
normalize the data relative to some base year. 78 In our case, we used
1985 as the base year. We then calculated a growth factor for each state
and year by dividing the population in that state in 1985 by the
number like 3, 2.45, etc. But in some cases, the dependent variable is a category like
smoker/non-smoker, male/female, true/false, 0/1, etc. These categorical variables (also
called binary, nominal, or dichotomous variables) are better analyzed with a logistic
analysis as compared to a linear ordinary least squares analysis. See DAMODAR
GUJARATI, ECONOMETRICS BY EXAMPLE 142-44 (2011).
178. This is a fixed base method by which we use an index or base year to calculate
the values of subsequent years. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX
NUMBERS: A STUDY OF THEIR VARIETIES, TESTS, AND RELIABILITY 19 (lst ed. 1922)
(discussing the fixed base method).
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population in that state in the later year. For State A in 1993, we have a
factor of 0.81.179 We then multiply the number of torts and the number
medical malpractice torts filed in State A in 1993 by that factor to get a
population-growth-normalized number of torts and medical malpractice
torts. Doing so gives us a normalized value of 10,481 torts filed and 497
medical malpractice torts filed in 1993. Thus, by eliminating the effects
of population growth, we discover that in State A, from 1985 to 1993,
there was a 2.5 percent decrease in per capita tort filings while,
simultaneously, there was a 35.8 percent increase in per capita medical
malpractice tort filings.
Once we normalized the ICPSR summary data in this fashion we
could use those normalized summary statistics to create a dataset that
contained one entry for each tort filed where population change was no
longer a potential confounding factor.18 ° We then needed to supplement
this dataset with the data from the State databases. The major difference
between the ICPSR data and the State databases is that the ICPSR
database is a state-by-state summary of filings in all 50 states while the
State databases contain detailed information for each tort filed in a
particular state. This difference matters because we needed the summary
data to normalize the data to take into account population change. To do
so, we created summary data from the State databases and then applied
the same process we used for the ICPSR data to create a normalized
dataset that took into account population change. 181
3. The Study Populations
Using the normalized ICPSR and State datasets, we created four
subpopulations to isolate the effects of adoption or elimination of
medical malpractice caps. Our question concerns whether adoption or
elimination of a medical malpractice cap has an effect on filings. Thus
our treatment variables are: {adopts a medical malpractice cap,
eliminates a medical malpractice cap}. To see the effect of the treatment
variables we examined filing rates relative to those treatment variables in
populations in which two other variables were held constant: {has a
medical malpractice cap during the entire study period, does not have a
medical malpractice cap during the entire study period}. This produced
four subpopulations for analysis:
179. 0.81 = 3,187,000/3,936,000.
180. See Stata Log File for ICPSR Dataset Creation, supra note 166.
181. See Stata Log File for State Dataset Creation, supra note 166. One principal
difference in the normalization process was that we normalized the ICPSR data with
1985 as a base year, but normalized the Alabama, Minnesota, and Washington data with
1992 as a base year. See id.
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No cap for entire Cap for entire
study period study period
Adopts a cap during 2
study period
Eliminates a cap 3 4
during study period
TABLE 2. Subpopulations for analysis
Unfortunately, we were not able to acquire data that we could use to
examine sub-population 4.
We then populated the three datasets ("Study datasets 1, 2, and 3")
using our ICPSR and State datasets with the relevant data. 82 In each
Study dataset we had "treatment" and "control" states. A "treatment"
state is a state that either adopted or eliminated a medical malpractice cap
at some point, and thus received the "treatment" during the study period,
while a "control" state is a state that did not receive the treatment during
the study period. 183 We restricted the study period to the three years
before a treatment state adopted or eliminated a medical malpractice cap
and the three years after adoption or elimination. 184  Because we
presumed the year of adoption or elimination of a cap would be one in
which confusion would reign, we eliminated that year from the study
period. Thus if State A adopted a medical malpractice cap in 1999, then
the study period would be 1996-1998 and 2000-2002.
a. Study Dataset 1: Florida, Mississippi, and North Dakota
Study dataset 1 compared states that adopted a medical malpractice
cap during the study period to states that did not have a medical
malpractice cap during the study period. Our datasets contained
information sufficient to study two separate study periods. First, in 1995,
North Dakota adopted a medical malpractice cap; thus, it is the 1995
treatment state. We compared North Dakota to six states, the controls,
that did not have a medical malpractice cap from 1992-1998: Arizona,
182. See Stata Log File for State Dataset Creation, supra note 166; Stata Log File for
ICPSR Dataset Creation, supra note 166.
183. See, e.g., MYOUNG-JAE LEE, MICRO-ECONOMETRICS FOR POLICY, PROGRAM, AND
TREATMENT EFFECTS 1 (2005) (discussing treatment and control groups).
184. To limit problems of heterogeneity that could arise over time, we limited the
study population to the three years before and after adoption or elimination of the cap.
For a discussion of the concept of "heterogeneity," see infra Part III.A.4.b.
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Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming. 185 Second, in
2003, Florida and Mississippi adopted a medical malpractice cap, giving
us two 2003-treatment states. There were five control states that did not
have a medical malpractice cap in place from 2000-2006: Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. 8 6 Not only is this
temporally diverse, but, as Figure 2 demonstrates, it is also a fairly
geographically diverse study population:
FIGURE 2. Geographic distribution of Study dataset 1187
b. Study Dataset 2: Florida and Mississippi
Study dataset 2 compared states that adopted a medical malpractice
cap during the study period to states that had a medical malpractice cap
in place throughout the study period. For this dataset, we had data for
one study period: 2000-2006. In 2003, Florida and Mississippi, the
treatment states, adopted a medical malpractice cap. We compared the
185. See Avraham, supra note 40, at 17-19, 81-83, 95-98, 106-08, 110-12, 123-26,
154 (discussing adoption of tort reform in Arizona, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Wyoming).
186. See id. at 36-42, 81-86, 99-103, 106-08, 123-26 (discussing adoption of tort
reform in Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and
Oregon).
187. States that are pure black represent the treatment state (North Dakota) for the
1995 series. States that are grey with white stripes represent states that are controls
(Arizona, Nevada, and Wyoming) only for the 1995 series. States that are black with
white stripes represent the treatment states (Florida and Mississippi) for the 2003 series.
States that are pure grey represent controls (New Hampshire and New Jersey) only for the
2003 series. States that are grey with black stripes are controls (Minnesota, New York,
and Oregon) for both the 1995 and the 2003 series.
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treatment states to three states that had a medical malpractice cap in
place during the period 2000-2006: Colorado, Missouri, and North
Dakota, the control states. 188 While not as geographically widespread as
the subpopulation for Study dataset 1, this subpopulation is still
geographically broad:
FIGURE 3. Geographic distribution of Study dataset 2189
c. Study Dataset 3: Alabama
Study dataset 3 compared states that eliminated a medical
malpractice cap during the study period to states that did not have a
medical malpractice cap in place throughout the study period. This
Study dataset proved to be the most difficult in terms of data. The
ICPSR database either did not have data relating to states that dropped
their medical malpractice coverage, or if it did, it did not have data for
potential controls. As such, we were required to reach out to a number of
states and purchase datasets directly from them. 190
In 1995, Alabama, the treatment state, adopted a medical
malpractice cap. We compared it to the control states, Minnesota and
188. See Avraham, supra note 40, at 25-29, 36-42, 84-90, 110-12 (discussing
adoption of tort reform in Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, and North Dakota).
189. States that are pure black represent the treatment states (Florida and Mississippi).
States that are pure grey (Colorado, Missouri, and North Dakota) are the controls.
190. See E-mail from Scott DeVito to Dean Hartzog, supra note 174; E-Mail from
Andrew W. Jurs to Wash. State Ctr. for Court Research, supra note 174; E-Mail from
Andrew W. Jurs to Debra Dailey, supra note 174.
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Washington, neither of which had a medical malpractice cap from 1993-
1998.191 This gives us the geographically wide, but sparse, coverage:
FIGURE 4. Geographic distribution of Study dataset 3192
4. Theory and Statistical Background
The goal of our analysis was to determine the effect of medical
malpractice caps on malpractice tort filings. A statistical analysis can tell
us whether two events are correlated with each other, but that correlation
does not provide a causal explanation outside of some theory that
explains why one of the events causes the other. 193 As such, we turn to
our expectations about the effect adoption and elimination of medical
malpractice caps have on medical malpractice filings.
a. Medical Malpractice Caps Lower Both the Attorney's and the
Injured Party's Expected Utility for Filing a Case
When a client comes to an attorney seeking representation,
representation will only arise if both the client and the attorney are
191. See Avraham, supra note 40, at 9-12, 81-83, 145-46 (discussing adoption of tort
reform in Alabama, Minnesota, and Washington).
192. States that are pure black represent the treatment states (Alabama). States that
are pure grey (Minnesota and Washington) are the controls.
193. See, e.g., DAVID R. HEISE, CAUSAL ANALYSIS 152 (1975) (discussing how
statistical analysis can lead to causal inference only in the context of a theory); 2
MAURICE G. KENDALL & ALAN STUART, THE ADVANCED THEORY OF STATISTICS 279
(1961) ("A statistical relationship, however strong and however suggestive, can never
establish causal conne[ct]ion: our ideas of causation must come from outside statistics,
ultimately from some theory or other." (emphasis added)).
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"satisfied" with the deal. Assuming, for ease of argument, that attorneys
are purely rational beings and that they make all decisions on the basis of
their economic self-interest, this means that an attorney will undertake to
represent a client only if the attorney believes that the expected utility of
taking on the case (the probability of winning times the expected fee) is
above some threshold. In essence, the attorney must believe that there is
a "good" chance that the attorney will gain some level of economic gain.
For example, if we assume a contingency fee arrangement and that
attorneys want to earn a $100,000 fee, then Figure 5 shows us that, given
the probability of success and the expected damages award, some cases













FIGURE 5. Representability given no cap present
When a state imposes a medical malpractice cap, it decreases the
expected damages award for a number of cases by lowering the
maximum award available. For example, as depicted in Figure 6, if our
medical malpractice cap limited damages to $500,000, this would mean
that the expected utility for a number of cases would fall into the "do not
represent" category when, before the cap, they would be cases for which
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FIGURE 6. Representability with cap present
The results in Figure 6 might change if the attorney did not hold
other factors constant. For example, the introduction of a cap lowers the
expected utility, and thereby the "representability," of a case by
decreasing the expected fee only if one holds one's fee constant. If the
attorney raises the fee charged, then, at least some of those newly un-
representable cases become representable again.
The injured party faces a double-effect from the introduction of a
medical malpractice cap. First, the potential award is lowered. This will
decrease the expected utility of suing, as calculated in terms of
probability of success times expected award, and thereby decrease the
incentive for the injured party to sue. Second, if the injured party is now
in the un-representable category due to the introduction of the cap, he or
she might be able to get representation if he or she allows the attorney to
increase the fee charged. That, however, has the effect of lowering the
expected utility of suing by further lowering the expected award.
Therefore, the introduction of a medical malpractice cap should
lower the relative proportion of medical malpractice torts filed to all torts
filed because the number of cases attorneys will be interested in
undertaking should drop, 194 while, simultaneously, the number of cases
injured persons are willing to undertake should decrease. For example, if
State A adopted a medical malpractice cap in 1995, we should see a
194. As discussed supra, other studies have shown that this is precisely what happens.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-77, 148-53.
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decrease in the relative proportion of medical malpractice torts filed in













FIGURE 7. Theoretical effect of adoption of a cap
The removal of a medical malpractice cap should have the opposite
effect. For attorneys, cases that did not have a sufficiently high expected
utility will now be in the range for representation. Moreover, those cases
may be taken on for lower fees because the expected award may be much
higher. Similarly, it is more desirable for an injured person to sue
because the expected return can be higher both directly, through
increases to awards, and indirectly, through decreases in attorney fees.
Thus, removing medical malpractice caps should raise the relative
proportion of medical malpractice torts filed to all torts filed. For
example, if State B eliminates a medical malpractice cap in 1995, we
should see the relative proportion of medical malpractice cases increase
in subsequent years:
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FIGURE 8. Theoretical effect of removing a cap
Thus, we begin our analysis with the theory that the introduction of
a medical malpractice cap creates a bar to entry to the court system for
litigants by lowering the expected utility of filing for both plaintiffs'
attorneys and the potential plaintiffs. We should see lowered utility play
out in two ways. First, if a state previously had no medical malpractice
cap, imposition of one should either lower the relative proportion of
medical malpractice torts filed to all torts filed, or, if the relative
proportion is increasing, decrease the rate of growth. Second, if a state
previously had a medical malpractice cap, then elimination of it should
either raise the relative proportion or, if the relative proportion was
decreasing, slow the rate of decrease. As noted below, this is precisely
what we find.
b. Fixed Effects Analysis
When the treatment and control populations differ with regard to
some statistically relevant factor, the populations are called
"heterogeneous." 195 Heterogeneity makes statistical analysis more
complex because differences seen in the study variable (e.g., filing rates)
195. See, e.g., RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 32-33 (8th ed. 1966)
(discussing the problem of heterogeneity in the context of pairing and grouping);
GUJARATI, supra note 177, at 5 (discussing the problem of heterogeneity); LEE, supra
note 183, at 9-10 (discussing causal inference as compared to statistical association).
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could be caused by differences in the treatment and control populations
other than the presence or absence of the treatment (e.g., adoption of a
medical malpractice cap). 196 Moreover, some of the differences in the
populations may be entirely unknown. 197 Therefore, any effect identified
could be caused by the treatment, the known differences in the
populations, or the unknown differences in the population.
The "ideal" way to deal with heterogeneity is to run a randomized,
controlled experiment.1 98 In our case, we would identify a set of states,
States A-N, that do not have a medical malpractice cap. We would then
record the values of all of the relevant variables relating to those States at
time (t), randomly assign each state to either treatment (adopts a medical
malpractice cap) or control (does not adopt a medical malpractice cap),
and record the filing rate each subsequent year until time t'. Under our
theory, we would expect this randomized controlled experiment to
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FIGURE 9. Theoretical effect of adoption of a cap
in a controlled, repeatable experiment
196. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 195, at 32-33; GUJARATI, supra note 177, at 5; LEE,
supra note 183, at 9-10 (discussing causal inference as compared to statistical
association).
197. See, e.g., LEE, supra note 183, at 18 (discussing the impossibility in any
experiment of making the various test populations identical in all relevant respects).
198. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUASI-
EXPERIMENTS 1-2 (1986) (discussing randomized, controlled experiments).
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For many studies, including ours, a controlled, randomized
experiment is simply not possible. In such circumstances, we turn to
"quasi-experimentation."' 99 A quasi-experimental study is an empirical
study that differs from traditional experimental design or randomized
controlled studies in that it specifically lacks the element of random
assignment to treatment or control. z0
Figures 7 and 8 represent a kind of quasi-experimental statistical
analysis called a "before-after analysis. '201 In a before-after analysis, we
measure the effect a treatment has on a population by comparing the
tested variable before and after the treatment is given.20 2 In essence, we
compare the rate of medical malpractice filings in North Dakota in the
period before North Dakota adopts a medical malpractice cap (1992-
1994) to the period after North Dakota adopts a cap (1996-1998). The
before-after analysis measures change over time within the same group,
presuming that any change in the tested variable is due solely to the
treatment.20 3 The problem with a before-after analysis is that there might
be some unknown covariate that changes over time within the population
and alters the measured variable. 204 As a result, it is possible that a
measurable effect might be caused by something other than the
treatment.20 5
A second kind of quasi-experimentation called "matching" works
by finding a state that has exactly the same relevant features as State A
other than the treatment variable, and then comparing how the rate of
medical malpractice filing differs between those two states.2 6  In
matching we compare two populations (e.g., State A and State B) over
the same period during which one population receives the treatment and
the other does not.20 7 Importantly, we must pick two populations that are
comparable20 8 and are presumed to have the same covariate values.2 °9
Unfortunately, it is extremely hard to identify all of the relevant factors
and find a comparable state that has exactly the same factors, except the
199. See id. at 2-5.
200. See id.
201. See LEE, supra note 183, at 64-65.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 65.
204. See id. at 65, 79, 99.
205. See id.
206. See LEE, supra note 183, at 79, 99.
207. See id. at 79, 99.
208. James J. Heckman, Hidehiko Ichimura, & Petra Todd, Matching as an
Econometric Evaluation Estimator, 65 REv. ECON. STUD. 261, 261 (1998). Two
populations are "comparable" if both populations "would have experienced the same
outcomes ... had they participated in the programme[.]" Id. at 262. A central difficulty
with matching is ensuring that the two groups are comparable. Id.
209. See LEE, supra note 183, at 79.
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treatment factor, as the treatment state during the study period. 2'0 There
is always a risk that some unknown variable could explain the result.
211
We can avoid many of these problems by combining before-after
analysis with a matching analysis.212 In essence, if we pick two
comparable populations where the only difference between the two is
that one receives the treatment and the other does not, then any
difference in outcome for the study variable (e.g., rate of malpractice
torts filed) between the two states must be a result of the treatment
because both states have all other variables in common.21 3
As we noted, the matching analysis has problems because we
cannot be sure that we have found two comparable populations. In our
case, we cannot be sure that our treatment and control states in the years
we are studying them are comparable to each other. To deal with this
problem, we can engage in a fixed effects regression analysis. 214 In an
ordinary linear regression analysis we would attempt to analyze the
relationship between a dependent variable-in our case, rate of medical
malpractice torts-and a set of independent variables-in our case,
whether the state has adopted a cap, the year, and a state identifier.215
We could do so by performing a regression analysis on:
Ratei,t = a1 + fli,tTi,t + y1S1 + Y2 S2 +... +YnSn + S1Y1,t +
2y2,t--.. + 56Y 6 ,t + i,t
where the subscript i identifies the state (so i = 1 for
state A, 2 for state B, and so on);
the subscript t identifies the year (so t = 1 for
year 1, 2 for year 2, etc.);
Ratei,t is the medical malpractice torts filing
rate at time t in state i;
Ti,, is a set of binary variables such that that is
set to 1 if the ith state at time t had a medical
malpractice tort and set to 0 otherwise;
210. See id. at 88-90 (discussing evaluating the success of matching); see also
FISHER, supra note 195, at 32 (discussing Darwin's pairing comparisons).
211. See FISHER, supra note 195, at 32; LEE, supra note 183, at 88-90.
212. See LEE, supra note 183, at 65, 79, 99.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 79 (noting that difference-in-differences analyses "can deal with
unobserved confounders to some extent"); see also Jurs & DeVito, The Stricter Standard,
supra note 163, at 716-23 (discussing that "difference-in-differences" models are a
special case of fixed effect analysis).
215. GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 177, at 8 (discussing econometrics models).
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Si is a set of numeric variables that identify the
ith state;
Yn is a set of numeric variables that identify each
year;
alis the y intercept;
fli, is the regression coefficient for the medical
malpractice tort binary variables for state i at
time t;
6 i is the regression coefficient for year i; and
,ii,t is the standard error term.
EQUATION 1
The problem with using an ordinary linear analysis is twofold.
First, the rate of filing is not a sufficiently sensitive measure to identify
the effect of adoption or elimination of a medical malpractice cap. This
requires us to adopt a one-entry-per-tort analysis in which the dependent
variable is a binary variable that is set to 1 if the tort was a medical
malpractice tort, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression, not linear
regression, is generally preferred when the independent variable is
categorical or binary.216 Second, because we are not certain whether our
treatment and control states are comparable, we cannot be sure we have
dealt with all of the heterogeneity simply by combining matching with
before-after analysis. In a further effort to avoid the consequences of
unknown covariates, we used a logistic fixed effects analysis with
dummy variables to determine if there was any correlation between filing
of a medical malpractice tort and adoption or elimination of a medical
malpractice cap. The advantage of a fixed effects analysis with dummy
variables is that it enables us to isolate more of the effects of unknown
variables.2 17
A fixed effects analysis218 is a regression analysis that is performed
on a regression formula that contains a set of dummy variables219 that are
216. See, e.g., ALAN AGRESTI & CHRISTINE FRANKLIN, STATISTICS 610 (2007);
GUJARATI & PORTER, supra note 177, at 387-89.
217. See LEE, supra note 183, at 79; see also Jurs & DeVito, The Stricter Standard,
supra note 163, at 720-23.
218. For a more detailed description of fixed effects analysis in general, see Jurs &
DeVito, The Stricter Standard, supra note 163, at 716-23.
219. Dummy variables are variables that have a value of 1 if a condition is met and a
value of 0 otherwise. GUJARATI, supra note 177, at 47. In our case, we create one
dummy variable for each year and for each state. So we would have DummyArizona,
DummyFlorida, etc. and Dummy_1985, Dummy_1986, etc. A dummy variable is set to
1 if it is true of that entry but set to 0 otherwise.
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designed to capture individual-specific unknowns.22° In our case, we
restructured the regression formula to contain dummy variables to
account for state- and year-specific unknowns.221 Combined with our
logistic approach, this produces the following formula:
TypeOfTort,t,n = a1 + #NS1, + fl2 S2,i + y1Yl,t +
Y 2 y2 ,t+ ... + Y 6 Y 6 ,t + Pi,t
where the subscript i identifies the state (so i = 1 when
the state is Alaska, 2 if the state is Arizona, etc.);
the subscript t identifies the year (so t = 1 for
1990, 2 for 1992, etc.);
the subscript n identifies this as the nth tort filed
in state i and year t;
TypeOfTortj,,n is a 1 if the nth tort in year t and
state i was a medical malpractice tort and 0
otherwise;
Sin, i is a set of binary variables such that S1 j is
set to 1 when i is 1 (the state is Alaska) and to 0
otherwise, S2,i is set to 1 when i is 2 (the state is
Arizona) and to 0 otherwise, etc.;
Y,t is a set of binary variables such that Y,t is
set to 1 when t = 1 (the year is 1985) and to 0
otherwise, Y2,t is set to I when t = 2 (the year is
1986) and to 0 otherwise, etc.;
czlis the y intercept;
fli is the regression coefficient for state i;
y1 is the regression coefficient for year i; and
/1 i,t is the standard error term.
EQUATION 2
220. The "fixed" in fixed effects model corresponds to the idea that the intercept for
each individual (in our case, states and years are individuals) is time invariant. We then
use the intercept for the first individual as the benchmark intercept. The dummy
variables "will show by how much the intercept coefficient of the individual that is
assigned a dummy variable differs from the benchmark category." Id. at 283.
221. When we perform the regression analysis using the formula, we must take care
to avoid a problem called the "dummy variable trap." See id. In our case, because we
have one dummy variable for each state and one for each year, we will encounter perfect
collinearity between (at least) one state dummy variable and one year variable and the
rate of removal intercept. See id. at 48, 283. To avoid this problem, we generally drop




At this point, the heterogeneity in the system should be captured and
isolated by the model.
B. The Results
Our first study population compared states that adopted a medical
malpractice cap during the study period to states that did not have a
medical malpractice cap in place during the study period. We had two
study periods, 1992-1998 and 2000-2006, and two sets of treatment
states. For the first period, North Dakota was compared to six control
states: Arizona, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming.
For the second period, Florida and Mississippi were compared to five
control states: Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and
Oregon.
In this study population, we would expect that the probability that a
tort filed is a medical malpractice tort to be less when there is cap in
place, as opposed to when there is not. The logistic fixed effects analysis
of this study population and period produced statistically significant
effects that support this hypothesis. We found that adoption of a medical
malpractice cap decreased the probability that a tort would be a medical
malpractice tort by 23 percent:
222
Adopted medical Probability that tort will be a medical
malpractice cap malpractice tort
Yes 0.0373648
No 0.0487044
TABLE 3. Study population 1223
Study dataset 2 compared states that adopted a medical malpractice
cap during the study period to states that had a medical malpractice cap
in place throughout the study period. For this dataset, we had data for
one study period, 2003, when Florida and Mississippi, the treatment
states, adopted a medical malpractice cap. We compared the treatment
states to Colorado, Missouri, and North Dakota, the control states, all of
which had a medical malpractice cap in place throughout the study
period.
In this study population, we would expect the probability that a tort
filed is a medical malpractice tort to be less when there is cap in place as
222. See Stata Log File for ICPSR Analysis, supra note 165.
223. The correlation coefficient for the cap adoption variable had a p-value of less
than 0.0005, meeting the p-value of less than or equal to 0.05 test for statistical
significance.
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opposed to when there is not. At the same time, we would expect the
change to be smaller relative to study population 1, because in study
population 1 the controls had no caps, which means they should have
higher base rates of filing, while in study population 2, the controls have
caps which means they should have lower (compared to the controls in
study population 1) base rates of filing. The logistic fixed effects
analysis of this study population and period produced statistically
significant effects that support this hypothesis. We found that adoption
of a medical malpractice cap decreased the probability that a tort would
be a medical malpractice tort by 13 percent (which is considerably less
than the 23 percent decrease for study population 1):224
Adopted medical Probability that tort will be a medical
malpractice cap malpractice tort
Yes 0.0589297
No 0.0675025
TABLE 4. Study population 2225
Study dataset 3 was restricted to the period 1993-1998 and
compared Alabama, which eliminated a medical malpractice cap in 1995,
to Minnesota and Washington, neither of which had a medical
malpractice cap during the study period. In this study population, we
would expect the probability that a tort filed is a medical malpractice tort
to increase when the cap is removed. That is precisely what we found.
We found that not having a medical malpractice cap increased the
probability that a tort would be a medical malpractice tort by 29
percent:
226
Eliminated medical Probability that tort will be a medical
malpractice cap malpractice tort
Yes 0.028013
No 0.0199264
TABLE 5. Study population 1227
224. See Stata Log File for ICPSR Analysis, supra note 165.
225. The correlation coefficient for the cap adoption variable had a p-value of less
than 0.0005, meeting the p-value of less than or equal to 0.05 test for statistical
significance.
226. See Stata Log File for State Analysis, supra note 165.
227. The correlation coefficient for the cap adoption variable had a p-value of less





By examining court data from 15 states between 1992 and 2006,228
we found that when a state adopts a damages cap in medical malpractice
cases the number of medical malpractice torts drops by over 20 percent,
a statistically significant change compared to non-cap states.22 9 We can
confirm the modification of the filing rate in reaction to tort reform by
examining the opposite situation; using the nullification of Alabama's
damages cap in 1995, we have also found that the percentage of medical
malpractice torts significantly increases when the downward pressure of
23the cap evaporates. 3° If we assume a world where medical malpractice
filings are essentially static, then, the effect of medical malpractice caps
can be depicted graphically as follows:
2.2%





i 1.4% 0 Statles Without Caps
1.2*%mState With Cap1.2%
1.0%
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FIGURE 10. Effect of med mal caps,
assuming a static baseline
While that finding is significant and interesting, it assumes that-all
things being equal-the background of case filings would remain a flat
line with neither growth nor decline. Yet, recent research has challenged
228. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington,
and Wyoming. See Stata Log File for ICPSR Dataset Creation, supra note 166; Stata
Log File for State Dataset Creation, supra note 166.
229. See supra Part III.B (finding of a 13% to 23% reduction in med mal filings after
cap adoption).
230. See supra Part III.B (finding a 29% increase in filings after cap nullification).
2014]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
that basic assumption, and in so doing, significantly increased the
importance of the finding we have made. In their 2013 study, Myungho
Paik and his colleagues analyzed med mal filings in states with caps and
those without such caps.231 While the researchers found that med mal
filings drop in states with tort reform, they also found that med mal
filings drop 24 percent even in states without damages caps!232 A recent
series of studies from the NCSC supports the same conclusion. In their
2011 work for the Court Statistics Project of the NCSC, Cynthia Lee and
Robert LaFountain analyzed med mal filings from 1999 to 2008, and
found filings had decreased 15 percent.233 The analysis has been updated
recently, and the filings decline has only grown: medical malpractice
case filings dropped 23 percent in the decade from 2001 to 2010.234
Considering those studies along with our finding, then, we have
discovered something quite serious. Because Paik et al. and Lee and
LaFountain can show between a 15 percent and 24 percent drop in med
mal filings in non-cap states in the 2000s, and because we can show a
drop in filings for cap states that is statistically significant compared to
non-cap states, our data reveal that the effect of tort reform is not as
depicted in Figure 10, but instead actually looks like this:
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FIGURE 11. Effect of med mal caps,
actual declining baseline
231. Paiketal.,supranote 11, at612.
232. Id. at 625 tbl.2; see also supra text accompanying note 86 (indicating a 42.4%
decline in cap states and a 23.8% decline in no cap states).
233. LEE & LAFoUNTAIN, supra note 86, at 3.
234. Court Statistics Project, supra note 86.
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Instead of a single decline in filings attributable to the adoption of
the damages cap, the filing rate for med mal cases instead is subject to a
"doubling-down" effect by the impact of two separate declines: one
attributable to adoption of a damages cap, and one occurring to all states
as a background effect.
The finding and quantification of the "doubling-down" effect of tort
reform is interesting by itself, but we also intend to examine the greater
implication of this finding by examining the impact this finding should
have on cost-benefit analyses of tort reform in the future. To do so, we
will first examine the purported purposes behind tort reform to examine
the benefits-side component, and then switch to the effects in light of this
doubling effect. Afterward, we will distill these greater findings into a
final policy prescription.
A. Benefits Analysis: At Best Mixed Support for Claims by Proponents
Whether examining the effects of tort reform on the legal system or
on the larger world, the empirical evidence supporting tort reforms seems
mixed at best, which leads to the conclusion that the benefits of tort
reform have been significantly oversold. Tort reform was enacted with
the goals of addressing health care professionals' dissatisfaction with
rising insurance rates and constraining "jackpot justice" in personal
injury compensation. 2" However, when one examines the studies on
filing rates prior to tort reform or in places without it, a different picture
emerges. In their 2005 study, Bernard Black and his colleagues
examined rates of insurance claims in Texas prior to adoption of tort
reform in 2003.236 They found that, instead of increasing, both the
number of claims per physician and number of small claims had declined
in the years leading to tort reform, while large claims remained
unchanged.237 Texas does not provide the only example, however. After
examining the tort filings in Illinois prior to tort reform in Illinois, Neil
Vidmar unequivocally stated there was no evidence of an increase in
filings in med mal lawsuits. 238 He concluded: "juries are not to blame
for the problems involving the increases in doctor's liability premiums.
It is time to look for other causes of the ailment., 239 The recent data
from the NCSC support both studies, finding that rates of med mal
filings have declined over 20 percent between 2001 and 2010, regardless
235. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 12; TORT POLICY STUDY GROUP, supra note 31, at
5; Republican Platform 2000, supra note 1.
236. Black et al., supra note 3, at 208.
237. Id. at 209-10.
238. Vidmar, supra note 3, at 348.
239. Id.
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of tort reform. Empirical research data do not support one major
underlying precondition-a crisis of rapidly rising filing rates-
necessitating tort reform.
Similarly, if one examines damages paid instead of filings made, the
empirical findings do not support the "jackpot justice" theory of tort
reform. Clearly, damages caps reduce the payout to plaintiffs suing
health care providers, and many studies support those findings.24° Yet,
when one digs into the data deeper, the effect is not as clear. One
analysis-controlling for the effect of severity of injury-found damages
caps had no significant effect on compensatory damages.24' In addition
to these studies, two additional points blunt the benefit of the cap. First,
Daniels and Martin have found that plaintiffs' attorneys believe that a
public relations campaign can be just as, if not more, effective in
reducing payouts to plaintiffs than direct tort reform legislation.242
Second, juries are increasingly skeptical of plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases. In his 2009 study, Thomas Cohen found that "win
rates" for plaintiffs in med mal cases were less than 23 percent, while all
plaintiffs had "win rates" of over 50 percent.243 By combining the
findings of Daniels and Martin and Cohen, we conclude that while
damages in court do show significant reductions, the effect of tort reform
may not be the entire story, and instead greater forces may be in play. At
best, the claim of proponents that tort reform is necessary to reduce large
pro-plaintiff verdicts lacks substantial support and is subject to
significant limitations.
In addition to these studies on the effect of tort reform on the legal
system, there are many studies on the proponents' claims of beneficial
effects outside the legal system, such as ending defensive medicine or
keeping health care providers in a specific area. Once examined in
detail, however, the empirical data do not support these asserted benefits.
In a series of studies since 2006, researchers have found that tort reform
does not reduce medical costs as anticipated by its proponents. A 2006
study by the non-partisan CBO concluded that tort reform did not
demonstrate any effect on Medicare expenditures. 244 A 2009 study by
Frank Sloan and John Shadle came to the same conclusion: direct
240. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at 35-41; Hyman et al., supra note 62, at 399;
Studdert et al., supra note 50, at 58; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-65.
241. Sharkey, supra note 58, at 445.
242. Daniels & Martin, supra note 69, at 1242-43, 1262.
243. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN
STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 tbl.4 (2009), available at http://1.usa.gov/lbJn8Mt.




reforms, such as damages caps, do not reduce Medicare spending. 245
Finally, Myungho Paik and his colleagues tested the same hypothesis by
examining the effect of tort reform in high-risk and low-risk counties in
Texas, thinking that if tort reform lowered "defensive medicine" the
costs in high-risk counties should go down.246 Instead of finding this
pattern, however, they concluded that spending in high-risk counties
either remained stable or increased; therefore, tort reform did not reduce
Medicare spending as suggested by proponents.247
A second benefit of tort reform suggested by proponents involves
the claim that physicians will move to areas of lower liability exposure,
so states without tort reform may have a doctor supply problem. Since
2005, four separate studies examined physician supply and tort reform
and concluded that there is no connection between the two.248 Of those
studies that have found a limited effect, the effect of tort reform as a
selection criterion by physicians pales in comparison to other factors
such as climate, HMO penetration, or availability of residency
programs. 249 At best, the available empirical research is unclear as to
whether tort reform substantially increases physician supply.
Although support for the proponents' arguments on tort reform may
lack a significant empirical basis, in one area the findings have been
clear: caps do reduce the size and number of insurance payouts.
Concerning the issue of payout size, Yoon's 2010 study on tort reform in
Alabama demonstrated that adoption of a damages cap reduced insurance
payouts by about $20,000, a significant difference compared to nearby
control states.25° Yoon also demonstrated that the nullification of the
Alabama damages cap in 1995 resulted in an increase in insurance
payouts, affirming the effect.251 In their 2013 study, Paik et al. also
found a connection: adoption of damages caps resulted in a 23 percent
reduction of the average payout and a 41 percent reduction in payout-
per-physician.252 On the issue of the number of paid claims, research
demonstrates between a 10 percent and 38.5 percent decrease after
253adoption of tort reform.
Even with this demonstrated change, however, there is a grey cloud
behind the silver lining. While insurance payouts have been declining,
245. Sloan & Shadle, supra note 120, at 488; see also supra text accompanying note
120.
246. Paik et al., supra note 122, at 181-82.
247. Id. at 173, 203; see also supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
248. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
251. See Yoon, supra note 89, at 216-20.
252. See Paik et al., supra note 11, at 627 fig.7.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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these reductions do not necessarily result in the lowering of insurance
premiums. 4 Several studies from the 2000s support the finding that tort
reform lowers insurance premiums, but vary widely on the size of the
effect.255 On the other hand, Hunter and Doroshow's 2002 study rejected
those studies' findings that insurance premiums lower in response to tort
reform.256 Instead, they found that states with "mid-range" reforms had
higher insurance rates than states with no reform at all.257 Considering
the findings of these contradictory studies, the effect of tort reform on
insurance premiums remains unresolved, especially when compared to
studies demonstrating caps' effect on damages.
By examining the proposed benefits of tort reform in light of the
current state of empirical research, we conclude that many of the benefits
claimed by proponents of tort reform are not matched by the current state
of empirical research, while others have mixed support.
B. Cost/Harms Analysis: Doubling-Down Effect and Barriers to
Personal Injury Compensation
If tort reform had some benefits but no drawbacks, it would
remain--on cost-benefit terms alone-a beneficial modification to our
judicial system. Instead, we believe that empirical research demonstrates
that even with some benefits as discussed supra in Section IV.A, the
negative impacts of tort reform are significant. The "doubling-down"
effect-adding additional reductions in case filings on top of reductions
in all states-has the effect of increasing undercompensation for medical
negligence. On a more detailed level, though, we see that tort reform
lowers compensation though two separate mechanisms: under-filing of
claims after injury, and under-payment for claims proven to be valid.
We begin with a discussion of the problem of undercompensation
through lawsuit deterrence. By analyzing New York data on claims filed
and a representative sample of hospital patients, Paul Weiler and his
colleagues assessed the rate of filing of lawsuits after injury.258 By
assessing individual patient records, Weiler and his colleagues found that
only one out of eight negligent injuries resulted in a claim; and, of those
claims filed, only half resulted in payment.259  These results are
consistent with a prior study by Patricia Danzon, who studied California
data on injuries and claims for her work Medical Malpractice: Theory,
254. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 113-16.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
256. See HUNTER & DOROSHOW, supra note 113, at 17-18.
257. Id. at 17.
258. WEILER ET AL., supra note 3, at 33-71.
259. Id. at 70-71.
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Evidence and Public Policy.260 She found that the number of claims after
negligent injury, less than one in ten injuries, was lower than Weiler's
calculation.261 In addition, she found that of those claims, only 40
percent received compensation for the plaintiff.262 If we consider these
stark data, which demonstrate that a significant number of negligent
injures never result in claims, and consider that we have found a
"doubling-down" effect of tort reform, beyond the baseline reductions in
all states,263 the problem of undercompensation for negligent injury is
getting worse, especially with damages caps.
We also believe there is a significant problem of underpayment for
filed claims. Damages caps act to undercompensate injuries by reducing
the compensatory damages available for a valid claim.264 The effect can
be severe in certain cases. A RAND corporation study from 2004 found
a 30 percent reduction in total damages in California due to a
265noneconomic damages cap. The same year, Studdert et al. analyzed
California's caps, finding that they reduced total damages awarded by 34
26percent. 66 More importantly, Studdert and his colleagues also found
another problem with caps: they result in undercompensation for the
most severely injured claimants.267 Hyman et al. found a similar result
analyzing Texas data: the most severely injured claimants are the most
undercompensated for their injuries after damages caps reduce claims.268
For most of these studies, the researchers evaluated the effect of caps on
those claims already found to be meritorious. 269 If Studdert, Hyman, and
their colleagues are correct, damages caps reduce compensation by
undercompensating the most gravely injured, even after their claims have
been proven. Considering these undercompensation issues in light of the
"doubling-down" effect of tort reform we have discussed, we believe that
tort reform causes significant harms by creating a suboptimal distribution
system for those most seriously injured. Sloan and Chepke may have put
260. DANzON, supra note 3, at 18.
261. Id. at 19.
262. Id.
263. See supra Figure 11 (depicting downward effect beyond lowered baseline).
264. See generally Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis,
348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2281, 2283 (2003) ("There is reasonable evidence that some of
these measures, most notably damages caps, do reduce payouts, albeit at the price of
undercompensating the most gravely injured patients." (endnotes omitted)); Paik et al.,
supra note 11, at 16.
265. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at xx.
266. Studdert et al., supra note 50, at 58.
267. Id. at 63.
268. Hyman et al., supra note 62, at 382 (finding a statistically-significant increase in
effect of damages cap for cases involving death).
269. Regarding the methodology of each study, see supra text accompanying notes
50, 53 (measuring reported jury verdicts).
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it more bluntly but were right when--considering the underclaiming and
undercompensation problems exacerbated by tort reform-they said: "if
there is any benefit to caps, it is mainly in redistributing income from
injury victims and their attorneys to health care providers.,
270
If only the undercompensation issue were the sole negative effect of
tort reform. Concurrent with the general problem of undercompensation,
there is significant research evaluating the discriminatory effects of caps
on certain population groups. The RAND study from 2004 found that, in
addition to the 30 percent reduction in plaintiffs' damages, those
reductions disproportionately affect female and elderly claimants.271
Using reported jury verdicts, they found that women plaintiffs had a
median reduction of their awards of 34 percent compared to 25 percent
for men.272 As for the elderly, 67 percent of injured plaintiffs over age
65 had a reduction in their award, compared to 41 percent for plaintiffs
273of all ages.
RAND is not the only study to report this finding. In their 2009
study of Texas data, Hyman et al. found that their cohort of elderly
plaintiffs had an aggregate reduction in their verdict amount of 51
percent compared to 37 percent for other adults, with a per-claim mean
of 23 percent compared to 19 percent for other adults.274 Finally,
Lucinda Finley's 2004 study of California tort reform from the Emory
Law Journal also found a disparate impact on both women and the
elderly.275 When assessing plaintiffs recoveries in light of California's
damages cap, Finley found that the cap reduced the average
compensatory damages awarded to female plaintiffs by over 48 percent
27and the median award by 57 percent. 276 This compares to 40 percent and
31 percent for male plaintiffs, respectively.277 For plaintiffs over age 65,
the average reduction was 34.6 percent, also above the median for non-
elderly males.278 To Finley, the effect of damages caps is nothing short
of a "form of discrimination against women [that] contribute[s] to
unequal access to justice or fair compensation for women., 279 Clearly,
the empirical research supports the conclusion that certain plaintiff
groups are more likely to feel the effects of damages caps than others,
270. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 1, at 309-10.
271. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at xxiii.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 20 tbl.3.1.
274. Hyman et al., supra note 62, at 381. Hyman's data sample did not allow for
evaluation of gender discrimination. Id.
275. Finley, supra note 55, at 1263.
276. Id. at 1285.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1313.
279. Id. at 1266.
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and we believe this discriminatory effect is an additional negative
externality of damages caps.
The undercompensation of plaintiffs' claims may serve as one
major problem effect of tort reform, and by itself has significant
problematic repercussions. We also believe, as Finley did, that in a
broader sense the undercompensation problem undermines a core
principle of our legal system, that of equal justice under the law. Caps
can also affect certain plaintiffs' ability to retain an advocate for their
cause.
When attorneys take into account tort reform measures that reduce
awards and fees, the attorneys must decline cases they otherwise might
accept. In the RAND analysis, for example, the effect of California's
tort reform measures of the 1970s was to reduce fees by 60 percent from
what they would be otherwise. 280 These fee reductions must, as a simple
matter of firm economics, affect the willingness of contingency fee
attorneys to accept cases. Daniels and Martin found that exact effect in
Texas, where over 90 percent of attorneys lamented the effect of tort
reform on their practices.28' In fact, the effect of damages caps may
affect the willingness of plaintiffs' attorneys to take high-value claims
more than other claims, said Steven Garber and his colleagues, because
those cases are the most likely to be capped.282 If so, damages caps have
not only a general negative effect on access to justice, by reducing
attorneys willing to accept contingency work, but also the more specific
and perverse effect of reducing the ability of the most severely injured
claimants to get representation. We believe, as Finley, Garber et al., and
Daniels and Martin do, that these provisions inhibit the ideals of access
to justice and equality before the law that are fundamental principles of
justice.
One final externality bears discussion independent of
undercompensating by under filing, undercompensating by damages
reductions, the discriminatory effects of those cuts, and access to justice.
Several studies have researched the effect of tort reform on litigation
costs and discovered that, independent of their other effects, damages
caps may also increase expenses. In their 2010 study, Ronen Avraham
and Alvaro Bustos found that litigation expenses might be larger in states
in which damages caps exist but are subject to further review or potential
280. PACE ETAL., supra note 52, at xxiv fig.S.1, 37.
281. Daniels & Martin, supra note 69, at 1239 tbl.2. They concluded that this has an
effect on access to justice because there is an illusory remedy in law if a claimant cannot
gain an advocate for representation. See supra text accompanying note 73.
282. Garber et al., supra note 74, at 682. Garber and his coauthors believe that these
provisions have a specific effect on access to justice. Id.
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nullification.283 Considering that constitutional challenges to tort reform
are commonplace and often successful, 284 the study suggests that most
states adopting damages caps will experience a period of increased
litigation expenses. A study of emergency department malpractice
claims from the same year, 2010, provides support for Avraham's
finding.285 In their analysis of emergency room claims from 1985-2007,
Brown et al. discovered that even when total claims and paid claims have
declined over the decades studied, litigation expenses have more than
doubled with an overall increase of 137 percent.286 Even in an era of
significant tort reform, then, litigation expenses have continued to rise.
When we began our cost analysis discussion, we affirmed that even
with limited benefits, tort reform could be beneficial if the drawbacks
were limited. We believe that in light of the significant negative
externalities of tort reform, the cost-benefit analysis results in our
conclusion that tort reform is not a beneficial modification to our judicial
system.
C. Policy Implications
Tort reform was intended as a cure-all for problems with medical
malpractice litigation: to stop defensive medicine, to lower insurance
costs, and to attract more health care providers to a more competitive
state environment for practice. Yet empirical research now demonstrates
that of these proposed benefits, the only clear effect has been to lower
insurance payouts, whether in damages or by non-lawsuit claims.287 But
to achieve those limited benefits, significant negative consequences have
arisen. Our research shows that damages caps reduce claimants' filings,
but do so in the context of a reducing overall level of claims in all states.
This "doubling-down" effect radically lowers filings, increasing
undercompensation for injuries caused by medical negligence.288
Considering these effects are more pronounced for female, elderly, or
283. Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps in Non-
Economic Damages, 30 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 293, 299 (2010) (finding that for
states with possible challenges to tort caps, litigation expenses increase as compared to
other states).
284. See, e.g., Ray v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Mobile, P.C., 674 So. 2d 525, 526 (Ala.
1995) (overturning cap in Alabama); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895,
899 (I11. 2010) (overturning cap in Illinois). See generally Avraham, supra note 40.
285. Terrence W. Brown et al., An Epidemiologic Study of Closed Emergency
Department Malpractice Claims in a National Database of Physician Malpractice
Insurers, 17 AcAD. EMERGENCY MED. 553 (2010).
286. Id. at 558 (finding expenses increasing from $12,693 in 1985 to $30,810 in 2007,
after adjusting for inflation, which corresponds to a 137% increase).
287. See supra Part V.A.
288. See supra Part III.B.
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severely injured claimants who file, and the caps negate the ability of
many claimants to find an attorney to represent them, the negative
externalities affect access to justice and may do so in a discriminatory
fashion. When the law "doubles-down" on those citizens who are least
able to defend themselves, and does so for the benefit of the few, we
believe something must be done.
When a law has been enacted for one purpose but has become
unmoored from that justification, it risks becoming illegitimate in the
eyes of the governed. In 1980, Chief Justice Burger stated: "we cannot
escape the reality that the law on occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts
long after the reasons which gave them birth have disappeared and after
experience suggest the need for change., 289 We believe damages caps
for medical malpractice cases have now met this threshold.
We therefore suggest to the state legislators addressing the issue
that they face a choice and have only two options. First, states with caps
or those considering them can reject the idea of a "silver bullet" that can
simultaneously solve insurance crises and medical litigation problems in
one fell swoop, without affecting anyone's legitimate interests. 290
Because the effect of tort reform is to lower insurance payouts, and
because it does so at significant costs to the elderly, to women, and to
access to justice, we believe that this is the preferred option.
Our legislators need not abide by our advice, however, and states of
course can maintain caps on damages recovery. But legislators must
acknowledge that many benefits of tort reform initially suggested by the
proponents of tort reform are not supported by current empirical
research. Our legislators also must know, as the data accumulate, that
the negative consequences of damages caps continue to collect. Beyond
that cost-benefit calculation, our legislators must also recognize that if
they choose to continue tort reform, they risk court intervention blocking
their efforts due to the discriminatory effect of the policies.29'
D. Future Research
There are several areas of further research that build upon our work
here, and we offer those as suggestions to further analyze the effect of
tort reform. First, our study applies logistic fixed effect models to the
analysis of the effect of damages caps in medical malpractice cases. We
289. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980).
290. For one of many reform ideas, see WEILER, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
291. See Finley, supra note 55, at 1314 ("Legislatures must be attentive to
discriminatory disparate impacts of damage cap laws on women and the elderly and
should avoid enacting provisions that so starkly undermine our national ideals of equality
and equal access to the civil justice system.").
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believe that the mathematical model would be equally effective in
assessing any of the other types of tort reform.292 The true limitation of
assessing tort reform is the availability of data, as Eisenberg and others
have noted. By assessing med mal caps, we believe we have a template
for the reasoned consideration of each reform measure, and we intend to
continue with those analyses as data permit.
We also believe that further research into whether reform was
necessary in the first place would be fruitful. Neil Vidmar's 2005
analysis of tort filings in Illinois293 prior to tort reform in that state, and
Bernard Black and his colleagues' work assessing the years leading to
tort reform in Texas, 94 could provide a template for additional study.
Because the proponents of tort reform claim out-of-control filings
necessitate litigation limits, 295 a post hoc analysis of whether that
assertion is valid could be replicated in other states.
A third possible area for further research involves analysis of the
connection of insurance claim reduction to premiums. One of the very
clear impacts of tort reform supported by recent empirical research is the
conclusion that tort reform can reduce insurance claim payouts.296 Yet
there is much less research about whether those insurance payout
reductions translate into reductions in insurance premiums.297 Detailed
analysis could affirm or refute that a benefit to carriers translates to
benefits to the medical providers, but more research is clearly necessary.
Finally, we also believe that additional analysis of tort reform and
its discriminatory impact will be critically important to the future debate
of the issue. The work of Finley, Hyman et al., and the RAND Institute
for Civil Justice shows that the effect of tort reform falls squarely on
women, the elderly, and the most seriously injured claimants; future
research could expand their findings to other reform methodologies, or
confirm their work using other datasets. Further delineation of the
discriminatory effect of tort reform would be essential to those seeking to
overturn these laws through equal protection challenges.
292. For a list of other tort reform methods, see supra text accompanying notes 40-
46.
293. Vidmar, supra note 3, at 340; supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
294. Black et al., supra note 3, at 207; supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 26, 32-34, 39.
296. PACE ET AL., supra note 52, at 35; Hyman et al., supra note 62, at 45; Studdert et
al., supra note 50, at 58; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-65.
297. Regarding the current research on insurance premiums and tort reform, see supra




Legislative adoption of tort reform since the 1970s often came as a
response to crises in insurance markets, but occurred without prospective
research into its effects. Only later did empiricists begin to assess the
effect of these limitations on plaintiffs in personal injury cases. As many
researchers have done, we decided to explore those effects empirically,
by analyzing changes in case filings in response to damages caps in
medical negligence cases. When we collected data from 1992 to 2006,
we found that the adoption of a med mal cap results in a reduction of
med mal filings of between 13 percent and 23 percent. We can confirm
the finding by assessing the effect of a cap's nullification, like what
happened in Alabama in 1995. Using separate state data, we found that
when a cap is invalidated, there is a corresponding increase in med mal
filings, which confirms the impact of the cap on filing decisions. When
our finding is added to recent research showing that all states have
experienced a decline in med mal filings in the last decade, we believe
tort reform "doubles-down" on claimants, meaning there is a background
reduction considering larger non-statutory change, and a second
reduction due to direct tort reform.
In the context of the debate over tort reform, we believe these
results provide significant force to the rebalancing of cost-benefit
assessments of tort reform. While the benefits of reform have been
oversold, the costs continue to rise. As the "doubling-down" effect
continues to further reduce filings, we believe damages caps no longer
make sense. Therefore, we suggest to state legislators that they have two
options: continue with the current course knowing that if they do not
change, courts may intervene; or, reject tort reform as the panacea to
solve insurance crises and medical litigation problems and move forward
elsewhere.
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